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TP 15175E

Industry Guidance: Airport Security Programs

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For use in conjunction with the
Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012



Canada

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Industry Guidance: Airport Security Programs

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FOREWORD

The *Industry Guidance: Airport Security Programs* has been prepared as reference material for aerodrome operators and aerodrome tenants with primary security line responsibilities (referred to as primary security line partners) in relation to the implementation of airport security program requirements that are found primarily under Division 9 in Parts 4 and 5, and Division 8 in Part 6 of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

This document is intended to support the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*, the definitive source for an aerodrome operator or primary security line partner's legal obligations respecting airport security programs. Using this document and the samples provided within is not mandatory and nothing in this document supersedes the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* or its subsequent amendments.

Transport Canada Aviation Security thanks the members of the Aviation Security Regulatory Review Technical Committee and the many aviation industry stakeholders whose willingness to participate in pilot projects and provide valuable comments and feedback during the development of the regulations have made this guidance document possible.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Brenda Hensler-Hobbs', with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Brenda Hensler-Hobbs
Director General, Aviation Security

MERGED GUIDANCE - CHANGE TABLE

CHAPTER	CHAPTER TITLE	CHANGES
General	All Chapters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documents reformatted ▪ Minor edits made to align with Phase 2 stylistic choices (e.g., “aviation security inspectors” rather than “Transport Canada inspectors,” etc.) ▪ Edits made to decrease redundancy and increase clarity ▪ Regulatory text updated to align with the amendments made to the regulations ▪ All references to the “upcoming Phase 2 regulations/requirements/expectations, etc.” were removed
1	Overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to encompass new Phase 2 provisions
2	AVSEC Levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New
3	Security Official	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clarification added regarding alternates and methods of communication
4	Aerodrome Security Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New chapter containing elements from Phase 1 guidance (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) ▪ Phase 1 content reorganized for clarity
5	Airport Security Program Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minor amendments made for clarity ▪ Paragraph on unauthorized disclosure prohibited material added ▪ Section on sensitive information reorganized for clarity ▪ New appendix added to assist aerodrome operators with compliance ▪ Regulatory text updated to match the regulations
6	Security Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sample restructured for clarity
10	Menus of Additional Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New
11	Emergency Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to include new Phase 2 provisions
12	Security Exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to include new Phase 2 provisions
13	Corrective Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to differentiate the sample from the general guidance text
14	Operators and Primary Security Line Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No major changes
15	Primary Security Line Partners Overview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to remove speculation regarding Phase 2 requirements
16	Primary Security Line Partners Security Official	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reorganized for clarity and to mirror the aerodrome security official chapter
17	Primary Security Line Partners Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Restructured throughout to increase clarity ▪ Paragraph on unauthorized disclosure prohibited material added ▪ Section on sensitive information reorganized for clarity
18	Corrective Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to differentiate the sample from the general guidance text ▪ No major changes
19	Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No changes
20	Class 2 and 3 PSLPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amended to remove speculation regarding Phase 2 requirements

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1. OVERVIEW

1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

This document is meant as guidance to explain regulations relating to airport security programs found in the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*. This guidance material contains information regarding airport security program requirements. It outlines Transport Canada's expectations for each core element, provides further information regarding the intent of the provisions, and gives examples of how these could work in practice. It also clarifies terminology used, and, where applicable, articulates how specific regulated criteria are used in an approval process.

1.2 PROHIBITION OF DISCLOSURE

The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* has clear restrictions on disclosing security sensitive information. Sections 213, 380 and 484 prohibit disclosure of security sensitive information that is created or used under airport security program requirements to a person other than the Minister unless the disclosure is:

- Required by law; or
- Necessary to comply or facilitate compliance with the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act*, regulatory requirements, or the requirements of an emergency direction.

As this guidance provides specific examples of security sensitive information, it must be protected from unauthorized access.

1.3 WHAT IS AN AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM?

An airport security program is intended to help an organization, such as an aerodrome or primary security line partner,¹ manage and support aviation security in a way that is comprehensive, integrated, coordinated and risk-based. It is comprised of elements, such as policies, processes, procedures, and practices that are focused on security preparedness, detection, prevention, response, and

¹ A "primary security line partner" means a business, organization or non-profit group – other than the operator of an aerodrome, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, a government department or agency or the police service with jurisdiction at the aerodrome – that occupies an area that is on an aerodrome's primary security line and that includes a restricted area access point. This definition includes, but is not limited to, a commercial lessee of the operator of the aerodrome.

recovery to safeguard civil aviation against acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference.

The current International Civil Aviation Organization definition for "acts of unlawful interference" is:

"Acts of unlawful interference are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation, including but not limited to:

- *unlawful seizure of aircraft;*
- *destruction of an aircraft in service;*
- *hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes;*
- *forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility;*
- *introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes;*
- *use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment; and*
- *communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility."*

Elements of an airport security program should be documented, implemented, and maintained.

1.4 WHY HAVE AN AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM?

An airport security program builds capacity to respond to emerging or unforeseen aviation security threats and risks by:

- Improving aviation security awareness and understanding of aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities within an organization;
- Encouraging and coordinating the sharing of aviation security information both inside and outside the organization, when and where appropriate; and
- Engaging the entire organization to be more involved and proactive in the management, coordination, integration, and continuous improvement of security through risk management, training, awareness, and preparedness.

An airport security program will further align Canada with international standards and practices and enhance the security and credibility of Canadian civil aviation.

1.5 AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS - TIMING AND PHASES

Following extensive consultations, Transport Canada divided the development and implementation of airport security programs into two phases:

- Foundational elements, which were published in the *Canada Gazette*, Part II on January 4, 2012 (sometimes called Phase 1); and
- More complex security management elements, published in the *Canada Gazette*, Part II on July 2, 2014 (sometimes called Phase 2).

The purpose of the phased approach was to provide immediate enhanced security performance, allow enough time to establish the foundational elements upon which subsequent (Phase 2) elements would be built, and give added time to address the more complex security management requirements.

The elements of an airport security program include:

PHASE 1

All aerodromes designated for security screening:

- Designating a security official
- Defining aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities
- Putting in place a security policy statement
- Responding to incidents/breaches
- Implementing a security awareness program
- Having scaled maps describing restricted areas, security barriers and restricted area access points
- Documenting regulatory compliance
- Maintaining a security committee
- Managing aviation security information
- Implementing corrective actions
- Enhancing emergency plans and security exercises

PHASE 2

All aerodromes designated for security screening:

- Establishment of a national "AVSEC Level" system to formalize communication of a change in the level of risk
- Requirement to develop a menu of additional safeguards to be implemented immediately in response to heightened risk conditions
- Requirements for training of security personnel that further align with international recommended practices
- Requirements for enhanced emergency plans and security exercises that further align with international standards

Class 1 aerodromes only*:

- Establishment of a multi-agency advisory committee
- Conducting an airport security risk assessment and submitting it for approval
- Developing and submitting a strategic airport security plan

*These requirements are not required of Class 2 or Class 3 aerodromes unless directed by the Minister

1.6 DEFINING TYPES OF REGULATIONS

The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* contain a mix of prescriptive, management-based and performance-based regulations, which are defined below. Airport security program requirements focus primarily on a mix of management-based and performance-based requirements.

Prescriptive regulations set out how to achieve a public policy objective. For example, a prescriptive regulation involving perimeter fencing might require that the fence must be a certain height.

Management-based regulations require regulated entities to develop and implement systems or processes to achieve a policy objective. For example: developing a security incident response protocol to ensure a consistent organizational approach to incident response.

Performance-based regulations focus mainly on the desired outcome or result. In other words, the regulation defines what the regulatory objective

is, but not how to achieve it. For example, an operator might be required to:

- Control access to a restricted area without details on what systems or controls to put in place; or
- Have a security committee to provide advice and help coordinate security at an aerodrome without detailing the exact terms of reference for the committee or its membership.

1.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE REGULATORY OBJECTIVE

Given the focus on management-based and performance-based requirements, it is important to consider the regulatory objective or intent of each provision for an airport security program. In many cases, compliance will be measured against achieving an objective, since Transport Canada will not prescribe how the objective should be achieved.

The following examples from the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* highlight regulatory objectives, which are indicated in *italic blue font*:

Establish and implement a process for responding to aerodrome-related security incidents and breaches *in a coordinated manner that minimizes their impact*.

Receive, retain, disclose and dispose of sensitive information respecting aviation security *in a manner that protects the information from unauthorized access*.

Have a security policy statement that *establishes an overall commitment and direction for aerodrome security and sets out the operator's security objectives*.

When developing and recording processes in response to required legislation, the following should be considered:

- Aligning all airport security program procedures, processes, standard operating procedures and directives with the stated objective/outcome of the regulated requirement;
- Remembering that compliance will be measured against the achievement of the objective/outcome; and
- Seeking guidance from Transport Canada if the provision/objective/outcome is not clear.

1.8 STAGGERED IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2

All Phase 1 elements for airport security programs are now in force. Transport Canada has staggered the application of Phase 2 elements to allow time for aerodrome operators to establish the elements and to facilitate implementation. Table 1.1, below, and Appendix 1.1 set out the application and date of coming into force for each upcoming airport security program element.

Table 1.1: Application and Enforceability of Phase 2 Elements

PHASE 2 ELEMENT	APPLICATION	DATE OF COMING INTO FORCE		
		CLASS 1	CLASS 2	CLASS 3
Multi-agency advisory committee*	Class 1 aerodromes <i>*Class 2 aerodromes only if ordered by Minister</i>	Dec 15, 2014	N/A ¹	N/A
Airport security risk assessment*	Class 1 aerodromes <i>*Class 2 and 3 aerodromes only if ordered by Minister</i>	Mar 15, 2015	N/A ¹	N/A ¹
Training requirements for security personnel	Class 1, 2, and 3 aerodromes	Apr 15, 2015	Apr 15, 2015	Apr 15, 2015
Enhanced emergency plans	Class 1, 2, and 3 aerodromes	Apr 15, 2015	Apr 15, 2015	Apr 15, 2015
Submission of the strategic airport security plan*	Class 1 aerodromes <i>*Class 2 and 3 aerodromes only if ordered by Minister</i>	Feb 15, 2016	N/A ²	N/A ²
Menu of additional safeguards to respond to a change in AVSEC level** (includes exercising safeguards)	Class 2 and 3 aerodromes	<i>**Part of the Class 1 strategic airport security plan</i>	Apr 15, 2016	Sept 15, 2016
Security exercises (related to menus of additional safeguards and AVSEC levels)	Class 1, 2 and 3 aerodromes	May 15, 2016	Sep 15, 2016	Mar 15, 2017
AVSEC Levels	Class 1, 2 and 3 aerodromes	May 15, 2016	Sep 15, 2016	Mar 15, 2017
Implementation of the strategic airport security plan	Class 1 aerodromes <i>*Class 2 and 3 aerodromes only if ordered by Minister</i>	May 15, 2016	N/A ³	N/A ³

1 If ordered by the Minister, the aerodrome operator has 10 months to implement the element.

2 If ordered by the Minister, the aerodrome operator has 22 months to implement the element.

3 If ordered by the Minister, the aerodrome operator has 25 months to implement the element.

1.9 SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE MATERIAL

Due to the sensitivity of the material, guidance on the multi-agency advisory committee, airport security risk assessment (including Annex C) and strategic airport security plan, as well as Annex A will be published separately. This material will be provided only to those aerodromes that require the information.

1.10 TRANSPORT CANADA'S OVERSIGHT PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of Transport Canada's Aviation Security Oversight Philosophy is to provide guidance, advice, and support to industry in the development of their airport security programs. The Department will assist aerodrome operators and partners in the development of airport security programs and provide feedback on how they can achieve compliance with the regulatory requirements. As Phase 1 elements have already been established, the guidance and advice from Transport Canada will be directed toward Phase 2 airport security program elements. Transport Canada's aviation security inspectors receive inspection and enforcement training, as well as specialized risk management training, to guide their decision-making for oversight and compliance activities.

Following the phased implementations period, aviation security inspectors will conduct inspections of aerodromes and primary security line partners to verify compliance with the regulatory requirements for airport security programs and may apply a range of enforcement actions in the event of non-compliance with the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* (e.g. letter of non-compliance, administrative monetary penalty, etc.).

1.11 INSPECTION FOR COMPLIANCE

Compliance with airport security program regulations for aviation security programs will be verified through on-site inspections by aviation security inspectors. Compliance with each regulation will be measured against the objective of the requirement. However, consistent with the Department's outcomes-based approach to

regulation, Transport Canada does not prescribe how the objective of each provision should be achieved. In order to evaluate whether or not an aerodrome operator or primary security line partner complies with the respective provisions, an aviation security inspector will use a Compliance Assessment Tool to determine the operator's level of compliance and to evaluate whether or not a requirement exists, has been implemented, and whether or not it is effective. For example:

- A security awareness program is documented and therefore it exists;
- Awareness sessions have been delivered in a classroom setting or using web-based training, establishing that the security awareness program has been implemented; or
- Discussion with employees at the airport reveal that they are familiar with their responsibilities with respect to aviation security and what to do in the event of an incident, establishing that the program is effective.

The Compliance Assessment Tool is currently under development. Subsequent to its completion, the Compliance Assessment Tool will be provided to aerodrome operators by Transport Canada upon request.

1.12 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

1.12.1 CHAPTERS

This document is divided into three chapters. The first chapter (Sections 2-14) outlines airport security program regulations for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodrome operators. The second chapter (Sections 15-19) examines regulations regarding primary security line partners at Class 1 aerodromes. The third chapter (Section 20) addresses regulations that apply to primary security line partners at Class 2 and 3 aerodromes.

1.12.2 SECTIONS

Each chapter is divided into sections reflecting each airport security program element. Each section presents step-by-step information that may be used by the aerodrome operator to assist it with achieving compliance with the regulatory requirements for airport security programs found in the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

1.12.3 PHASE 2 ELEMENTS

The previous version of the *Industry Guidance: Airport Security Programs* described only Phase 1 elements. The current version has merged the two phases together to create one guidance document. As such, Phase 1 elements will be titled in **TEAL**, while the new Phase 2 elements will be titled in **GREEN**, both in the Table of Contents and within the document. Only minor changes have been made to the Phase 1 guidance material.

While this document replaces the previous version of the guidance material it must again be noted that nothing in this document supersedes the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* or its subsequent amendments.

1.12.4 ELEMENTS THAT ONLY APPLY TO SPECIFIC CLASSES OF AERODROMES

Some Phase 2 elements apply only to specific classes of aerodromes. An asterisk (*) following the title of a section indicates that the element being described in that section may not apply to all classes of aerodromes. Information regarding the class(es) of aerodrome(s) to which the element applies will be found in *italics* directly below the title of the section.

1.12.5 SAMPLES

Throughout this document, samples will be shown in a box with a green background.

1.12.6 APPENDICES AND ANNEXES

Appendices can be found at the end of the sections. Annexes can be found at the end of the guidance material.

1.13 WHERE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS

The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* sometimes makes reference to the Minister. In these cases, the Regional Director of Security and respective aviation security inspectors working in each region act as the Minister's representative. Aerodrome operators and primary security line partners may contact these individuals at the following numbers:

Atlantic Region (902) 431-8563	45 Alderney Drive, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia B2Y 2N6
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Quebec Region (514) 633-3557	700 Leigh-capreol Place, Dorval, Quebec H4Y 1G7
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Ontario Region (416) 952-0519	4900 Yonge Street, North York, Ontario M2N 6A5
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Prairie Northern Region (204) 983-2168	344 Edmonton Street, Winnipeg Manitoba R3B 2L4
--	--

Pacific Region (604) 666-3190	800 Burrard Street, Vancouver, British Columbia V6Z 2J8
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Inquiries may also be submitted to the general airport security program mailbox (ASP-PSA@tc.gc.ca). The inquiries will be forwarded to the appropriate contact. It is important that security sensitive inquiries are not transmitted through the above mailbox.

APPENDIX 1.1: STAGGERED IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2

		2014												2015												2016												2017											
		SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC																				
Date element comes into force on the 15th of indicated month		CASR 2012 including Amendments to ASP (Phase 2) Applies (including security exercises except those related to additional safeguards)																																															
Date element submitted for approval		Multi-Agency Advisory Committee																																															
Date element to be approved by TC (based on service standard)		Security Personnel Training																																															
		Changes to Emergency Plans – Class 1																																															
		Risk Assessments																																															
		Security Plans including Menus of Safeguards – Class 1																																															
		Implementation of Approved Security Plan – Class 1																																															
		Operation and Discussion based exercises as they relate to menus – Class 1																																															
		AVSEC Levels – Class 1																																															
		Security Personnel Training																																															
		Changes to Emergency Plans – Class 2																																															
		Menu of Safeguards – Class 2																																															
		Operation and Discussion based exercises as they relate to menus – Class 2																																															
		AVSEC Levels – Class 2																																															
		Security Personnel Training																																															
		Changes to Emergency Plans – Class 3																																															
		Menu of Safeguards – Class 3																																															
		Operation and Discussion based exercises as they relate to menus – Class 3																																															
		AVSEC Levels – Class 3																																															
		Menu of Safeguards																																															
		Operation and Discussion based exercises as they relate to menus																																															
		AVSEC Levels (Class 3)																																															

PUBLISHED IN CANADA GAZETTE PART 2

CHAPTER 1 - REQUIREMENTS FOR AERODROME OPERATORS



2. AVSEC LEVELS*

*Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes

2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

AVSEC levels are used by Transport Canada to:

- Communicate a change in the level of risk; and
- Set a regulated obligation that aerodrome operators take the necessary action(s) to address the heightened risk for a specified duration.

Regulatory requirements exist to mitigate ongoing aviation security risks. However, in the event of a short-term heightened risk condition, there are often supplementary actions that can be taken in addition to baseline requirements in order to enhance aviation security.

AVSEC levels and menus of additional safeguards are intended to address a heightened risk on a short-term basis (i.e. days to weeks in length). The duration for which the AVSEC level would be raised will be determined by the Minister and will depend upon the specifics of the circumstance. Other regulatory instruments, such as interim orders, etc., will be used to address issues requiring a longer term solution.

Transport Canada raises the AVSEC level when:

- Information suggests that there is an increased risk that the existing security posture may not sufficiently address; and
- Additional safeguards, under the aerodrome operator's control, can be applied and will likely mitigate the risk of the threat taking place.

Depending on available information, AVSEC levels could be imposed nationally, regionally, locally, to a specific aerodrome, or to a specific part of an aerodrome.

In response to a change in risk condition, the Minister may raise the AVSEC level from Level 1 (normal operating conditions) to Level 2 (elevated risk) or Level 3 (critical or imminent risk). Class 1, 2, and 3 aerodrome operators will be responsible for selecting and implementing the safeguards that best mitigate the heightened risk. A menu of additional safeguards is a list of supplementary security activities, actions, and procedures that an aerodrome operator can employ in a heightened risk condition. Aerodrome operators can select

safeguards from their pre-approved menus of additional safeguards, although they are not limited to the menu. For further information on menus of additional safeguards, please see Section 10.

2.2 APPLICATION

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Part 13, Division 2, s. 778*

Application:

This Division applies in respect of aerodromes listed in Schedules 1 to 3 or in respect of any part of those aerodromes.

These requirements apply to Class 1, 2 and 3 aerodromes. Note that in the future, Transport Canada intends to apply requirements for AVSEC levels to other industry stakeholders and/or partners, such as air carriers and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

2.2.1 AVSEC LEVELS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER REGULATORY TOOLS

Other regulatory tools, such as security notices, interim orders, and emergency directions, ensure that aerodrome operators address heightened risk conditions. However, they tend to be prescriptive as they do not allow the aerodrome operator to choose the safeguards to be applied. AVSEC levels, on the other hand, represent a shift toward management- and performance-based regulations. They provide aerodrome operators the flexibility to choose the safeguards that will best address the change in risk condition. By developing and selecting from approved menus of additional safeguards, aerodrome operators will be better prepared to more rapidly deal with situations of heightened risk.

The Minister's decision to use AVSEC levels will be affected by the specificity of the threat, the time permitted to address the risk, and the number of parties potentially affected. These factors will also affect whether the Minister uses the AVSEC level alone or as a complement to another existing regulatory tool.

Transport Canada will share information about the heightened risk condition with aerodrome

operators and allow them to choose the best course of action to address the risk.

2.3 THE THREE LEVEL SYSTEM

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Part 13, Division 2*

Level 1:

779. Unless it is raised, lowered or maintained in accordance with this Division, the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome is level 1. At that level, normal operating conditions apply.

Level 2:

780. The Minister must raise or lower to level 2 the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome if

- (a) the Minister is made aware of a heightened risk condition related to an elevated risk; and*
- (b) it is likely, based on available information, that additional safeguards at the aerodrome or a part of the aerodrome will mitigate the heightened risk condition.*

Level 3:

781. The Minister must raise to level 3 the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome if

- (a) the Minister is made aware of a heightened risk condition related to a critical or imminent risk; and*
- (b) it is likely, based on available information, that additional safeguards at the aerodrome or a part of the aerodrome will mitigate the heightened risk condition.*

Multiple aerodromes:

785. For greater certainty, nothing in this Division prohibits the Minister from raising, lowering or maintaining the AVSEC level for more than one aerodrome at a time.

There are three AVSEC levels. The first level indicates baseline operating conditions, while Level 2 and Level 3 are action-oriented, heightened security risk levels. The levels are differentiated as follows:

- **Level 1:** Security level for which the Canadian national civil aviation system maintains minimum/regular security procedures at all times to deal with security risks. At this level, normal operating conditions apply. For example, the normal procedures at the aerodrome related to access control and/or monitoring/patrolling apply.
- **Level 2:** Security level indicating an **elevated** security risk against the Canadian national civil aviation system, and for which additional security procedures need to be maintained above Level 1 for a **limited**² period of time. The elevated risk may be due to a credible terrorist threat to civil aviation, an increase in the likelihood of an act of unlawful interference with the civil aviation system, or a change in the criticality of a potential civil aviation target. The threat may or may not be specific. This level could be applied nationally, regionally, locally, to a specific aerodrome, to a specific part of an aerodrome, and/or in conjunction with other regulatory tools. In order for the AVSEC level to be raised to Level 2, the Minister must be made aware of a heightened risk condition related to an elevated risk **and** it must be likely that additional safeguards implemented by the aerodrome operator will mitigate the heightened risk condition.
- **Level 3:** Security level indicating a **critical or imminent** security risk against the Canadian national civil aviation system for which considerable additional security procedures need to be maintained above Level 1 or 2 for a **limited**³ period of time. The critical or imminent security risk may be due to an imminent credible terrorist threat to civil aviation, a high increase in the likelihood of an act of unlawful interference with the civil aviation system, or a significant change in the criticality of a potential civil aviation target. The threat may be specific and/or imminent. This level could be applied nationally, regionally, locally, to a specific aerodrome, to a specific part of an aerodrome, and/or in conjunction with other regulatory tools. In order for the AVSEC level to be raised to Level 3, the Minister must be made aware

² - ³ The length of time for which additional safeguards will need to be implemented as a result of AVSEC Level 3 will be determined by the Minister and will depend upon the specifics of the circumstance at hand. That said, AVSEC levels and menus of additional safeguards are intended to address issues that are temporary in nature (i.e. days to weeks in length).

of heightened risk condition related to a critical or imminent risk **and** it must be likely that additional safeguards implemented by the aerodrome operator will mitigate the heightened risk condition.

2.4 SHUTDOWN

The Minister of Transport or his or her delegate could order the aerodrome (or part of the aerodrome) to be shutdown if he or she were to deem a security risk so great that it could not be mitigated by a change in AVSEC level (and the implementation of corresponding safeguards) or the use of another regulatory instrument. The authority for the Minister to do so comes from sections 4.76 and 6.41 of the *Aeronautics Act*. Section 4.76 of the Act authorizes the Minister to direct any person to do or refrain from doing anything that the Minister considers necessary to respond to an immediate threat to aviation security. Section 6.41 of the Act allows the Minister to make interim orders:

- *To deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to aviation safety or the safety of the public;*
- *To deal with an immediate threat to aviation security; or*
- *For the purpose of giving immediate effect to any recommendation of any person or organization authorized to investigate an aviation accident or incident.*

2.5 CHANGING THE AVSEC LEVEL

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Part 13, Division 2*

Requirement to lower level:

782. The Minister must, as soon as a heightened risk condition no longer applies, lower to level 1 an AVSEC level that has been raised for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome.

Maintaining a level:

783. The Minister is authorized to maintain an AVSEC level that has been raised for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome if the criteria for raising the AVSEC level continue to apply.

Notification:

784. If the Minister raises, lowers or maintains the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome, the Minister must immediately notify the operator of the aerodrome. The notice must

- (a) include information about the heightened risk condition; and*
- (b) specify a date on which the AVSEC level is likely to return to level 1.*

2.5.1 AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THE AVSEC LEVEL

The Minister of Transport, via the powers of the *Aeronautics Act*, holds the authority to formally heighten, maintain, and/or lower the AVSEC level. This responsibility will likely be sub-delegated to the Director General, Aviation Security. Although the Minister will hold the authority to formally heighten or lower the AVSEC level, an aerodrome operator can independently choose to raise its security posture at any time.

2.5.2 DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO CHANGE OR MAINTAIN THE AVSEC LEVEL

The Director General, Aviation Security; the Aviation Security Operations directorate; and other relevant participants will jointly assess the security risk to determine whether or not the level should be changed and/or maintained. They will also determine the actual numeric AVSEC level (i.e. Level 1, 2, or 3). For a graphical representation of the process for changing the AVSEC level, please see the chart in Appendix 2.1.

2.5.3 REQUIREMENT TO LOWER THE AVSEC LEVEL

The Minister is obligated to lower the AVSEC level back to Level 1 (normal operating conditions) as soon as the heightened risk condition no longer exists. Recognizing cost implications, AVSEC levels are not intended to be extended unnecessarily. Should the threat landscape change to the point where a longer term or more permanent solution needs to be applied, consultations with stakeholders would be undertaken.

2.5.4 MAINTAINING AN AVSEC LEVEL

The Minister has the authority to maintain a heightened AVSEC level provided the risk conditions

still apply and additional safeguards would continue to be effective in mitigating the risk.

2.5.5 NOTIFICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE AVSEC LEVEL

Transport Canada will issue a notification to affected aerodrome operators and security partners immediately following the decision to change or maintain an AVSEC level above Level 1. At this time, Transport Canada's Aviation Security Operations directorate is reviewing options for communicating and monitoring a change in AVSEC level, but may use a combination of the Security Regulatory Advisory System (SRAS), secure or unsecure teleconference, mass e-mail, secure communications, and/or the Regional Duty Inspector. Regardless, aerodrome operators will be advised of a change in AVSEC level in multiple ways.

The notification will inform aerodrome operators of the:

- AVSEC level status (i.e. Level 2, 3, or back to Level 1);
- Information about the heightened risk condition, including the potentially affected area(s) (e.g. front of house, etc.) and the nature and scope of the threat (e.g. potential vehicle-borne explosive, etc.), in order to assist with the selection of additional safeguards;
- Effective date (i.e. the level is effective as of DATE and TIME);
- Length of time the AVSEC level will likely be raised (i.e. the level will be in effect until DATE X, and will be reassessed on DATE Y); and
- Date and time by which the aerodrome operator will need to inform Transport Canada of the additional safeguards they intend to implement or have already implemented.

2.5.6 REVIEW OF A RAISED AVSEC LEVEL

As noted earlier, the notification of an AVSEC level change will detail the expected date on which the AVSEC level will return to normal operating conditions (Level 1). The timeframe could be extended only by issuing another notification.

The raised AVSEC level will be reviewed by Transport Canada periodically to determine whether or not it can be lowered sooner than the timeframe specified in the notification. The rate of review will be based on a range of information including new intelligence and the degree of risk present. Transport Canada is currently working on

an operational policy that will articulate the rate of review for each raised level.

2.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS - THE ROLE OF AERODROME OPERATORS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 3, s. 96 – s. 99

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 3, s. 260 – s. 263

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 3, s. 415 – s. 418

Division overview:

This Division sets out requirements respecting the implementation of additional safeguards in the event of heightened risk conditions.

Additional safeguards:

If the AVSEC level is raised or maintained above level 1 for an aerodrome or any part of the aerodrome, the operator of the aerodrome must immediately take the following actions:

- (a) determine which additional safeguards are most likely to help mitigate the heightened risk condition;*
- (b) notify any persons or organizations that have aviation security roles and responsibilities at the aerodrome and are affected by the heightened risk condition;*
- (c) implement or continue to implement the additional safeguards; and*
- (d) notify the Minister of the additional safeguards that are being or will be implemented.*

Notification:

When the AVSEC level is lowered for an aerodrome or any part of the aerodrome, the operator of the aerodrome must immediately notify the persons and organizations that were notified under paragraph 97(b) [261(b), 416(b)].

Legal powers and obligations:

For greater certainty, nothing in these Regulations authorizes the operator of an aerodrome to implement additional safeguards that are inconsistent with the operator's legal powers and obligations.

2.6.1 HEIGHTENED LEVEL AND MAINTAINING A HEIGHTENED LEVEL

Following a notification of a change in AVSEC level, aerodrome operators will be required to immediately⁴ take the following actions to address an AVSEC level above Level 1:

- Determine which additional safeguards are most likely to help mitigate the heightened risk condition;
- Notify any persons or organizations that have aviation security roles and responsibilities at the aerodrome and are affected by the heightened risk condition;
- Implement or continue to implement additional safeguards; and
- Notify the Minister of the additional safeguards that are being or will be implemented.

Aerodrome operators are required to notify the Minister of the additional safeguards that are being implemented or will be implemented. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary for the aerodrome operator to implement some safeguards prior to its notification to the Minister. That said, the Minister must be notified once the aerodrome operator has put the safeguards into place.

Aerodrome operators will be expected to use the information from the notification and/or any further context received from Transport Canada to review their current approved menu of additional safeguards (as well as any other potential additional safeguards), and determine which additional safeguards are the most likely to help mitigate the heightened risk condition.

For example, if the Minister raised the AVSEC level in response to a heightened risk in the public concourse of the aerodrome terminal, the aerodrome operator could select a combination of additional safeguards, such as the following, from its approved menu of additional safeguards, although the aerodrome operator would not be limited to its menu:

- Implement enhanced, pre-prepared aerodrome checklists for terminal inspections;
- Alter the queue management process for passenger check-in;

- Implement additional announcements for an unattended baggage program;
- Reduce the number of publically available entrances into the terminal building by locking or guarding doors;
- Implement a validation process at the entrance to terminal buildings by situating security guards to check documents of entitlement; and/or
- Prohibit public access to the terminal building for a limited period of time to deal with the particular heightened risk condition.

2.6.2 COMMUNICATION BY THE AERODROME OPERATOR - LOWERED AVSEC LEVEL

When an AVSEC level is lowered, aerodrome operators are required to immediately notify persons or organizations that have aviation security roles and responsibilities at the aerodrome. This could include the aerodrome operator's personnel or those within the aerodrome community such as primary security line partners. Prompt communication ensures that persons or organizations will not maintain heightened safeguards for longer periods than required.

2.6.3 LIMITATIONS ON AERODROME OPERATORS' LEGAL POWERS AND OBLIGATIONS

An aerodrome operator must only implement additional safeguards that are within the aerodrome operator's legal powers and obligations. For example, as the aerodrome operator has no responsibility in terms of screening, none of the additional safeguards submitted for approval in an aerodrome operator's menu or implemented during a heightened risk condition can involve screening. Similarly, an aerodrome operator has no legal authority for the search of persons. The aerodrome operator is, among other things, responsible for access control, and there are a number of additional safeguards available to augment access control from those safeguards that are currently in place.

2.6.4 IMPLEMENTATION TIMEFRAMES

On May 15, 2016, the AVSEC level system will formally come into force for Class 1 aerodromes. AVSEC levels will come into effect for Class 2 and


⁴ "Immediately" means without delay.

Class 3 aerodromes on September 15, 2016 and March 15, 2017, respectively. At this time, Transport Canada will begin communicating heightened risk conditions using AVSEC levels to aerodrome operators.

2.7 ASSESSING COMPLIANCE

Once the regulations are in force, Transport Canada will evaluate how well an aerodrome operator complies with the provisions. Measuring an aerodrome operator's response to a heightened security risk can be done only following the raising or lowering of an AVSEC level as a result of an actual security event or a security exercise that has tested the aerodrome operator's ability to respond. An aviation security inspector will use a Compliance Assessment Tool to determine the aerodrome operator's level of compliance with each applicable regulatory provision. The Compliance Assessment Tool is currently under development. Subsequent to its completion, it will be provided to aerodrome operators by Transport Canada upon request.

APPENDIX 2.1 RAISING OR LOWERING THE AVSEC LEVEL



3. SECURITY OFFICIAL*

*Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes

3.1 AVAILABILITY OF SECURITY OFFICIAL(S)

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 4, s. 112 (1)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 4, s. 270 (1)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 4, s. 425 (1)

Requirement:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must have, at all times, at least one security official or acting security official.

- The aerodrome operator is required to identify at least one security official or acting security official to be available at all times. While they do not have to be on-site at all times, they have to be available.
- As security official(s) may not be available 24 hours a day/7 days a week throughout the entire year due to vacation, illness, etc., aerodrome operators should assign an alternate to cover the role of the security official when he or she is on vacation or is absent.
- An alternate would not be necessary if the aerodrome has more than one security official whose schedules cover the availability requirement of 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- Larger aerodromes may have a number of security officials, including senior management and/or security personnel, who would respond to security incidents and deal with Transport Canada at the local level.

3.2 PROVIDE THE MINISTER WITH THE NAME AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF THE SECURITY OFFICIAL(S)

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 4, s. 112 (2)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 4, s. 270 (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 4, s. 425 (2)

Contact information:

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must provide the Minister with

- (a) the name of each security official and acting security official; and*
- (b) 24-hour contact information for those officials.*

- The aerodrome operator must provide the Minister with the name of the security official(s).
- The aerodrome operator must provide the Minister with the security official(s)' contact information.
- Notification about security official(s) or any changes should be made in writing to the Regional Director of Security who will accept notification on behalf of the Minister.

Transport Canada encourages aerodrome operators to establish the most effective means of keeping the Minister informed, including:

- Changes to the name and contact information of the security official(s); and
- Any changes to their preferred communications process, if one exists.

The process for contacting a security official may include providing Transport Canada with a:

- Pager number;
- Telephone number (including a security operations control centre number, if applicable); and/or
- Schedule for the security official.

While many aerodromes already have an efficient means of communication with Transport Canada it may not be documented. If the aerodrome wants to continue with the existing process, it would be good to document the process. This could be done in coordination with the Regional Director of Security, and/or with the assistance of aviation security inspectors.

Under the regulations, aerodrome operators must provide the Minister with the name of each security official or acting security official. This can be done by email, letter, or within another security program document; however the list of names must be kept current. Aerodrome operators should review their information on a regular basis to ensure that contact numbers and schedules are up-to-date or that pagers, where used, are working properly.

4. AERODROME SECURITY PERSONNEL*

*Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes

4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Regulations related to the training of aerodrome security personnel were previously found in the *Aerodrome Security Measures* and have always been part of Canada's Aviation Security regulatory framework. This section provides guidance regarding new requirements for the training of aerodrome security personnel, as well as training requirements previously found in the *Aerodrome Security Measures* that were disclosed and amended in the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*. Aerodrome operators will still need to refer to the *Aerodrome Security Measures* to view undisclosed requirements for aerodrome security personnel.

The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* defines "aerodrome security personnel" as: *Individuals who are employed by the operator of an aerodrome or by one of the operator's contractors to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to and assist in the recovery from acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.*

To be more specific, aerodrome security personnel are those employees or contractors or groups of employees or contractors who have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities as described in the definition above. Subsections 191 (2) (a) and (b), 347 (2) (a) and (b), and 455 (2) (a) and (b) of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*, stipulate that aerodrome operators at Class 1, 2, and 3 aerodromes define, document, and communicate the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to each of the aerodrome operator's employee groups and contractor groups.

An employee (or employee group) of the aerodrome is anyone who is employed directly by the aerodrome operator. A contractor (or contractor group) of the aerodrome is anyone who is contracted by the aerodrome operator, such as a security guard service, police of jurisdiction, electrical contractors, etc. While other persons

employed at the aerodrome may be required to comply with security requirements, participate in the security awareness program of the aerodrome operator, report security incidents, etc., they are not aerodrome security personnel. Only those persons who are assigned actual security duties (i.e. access control, responding to incidents, issuing restricted area identity cards, etc.) are considered security personnel with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities for the purpose of the regulatory requirements of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

4.2 AERODROME-RELATED SECURITY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191(2) (a) and (b)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347(2) (a) and (b)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455(2) (a) and (b)

Program requirements:

(2) As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must:

- (a) define and document the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to each of the operator's employee groups and contractor groups;*
- (b) communicate the information referred to in paragraph (a) to the employees and contractors in those groups.*

4.2.1 DEFINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The aerodrome operator is required to determine which employee groups and/or contractor groups in their organization have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. Aerodrome operators with many employees and/or contractors may wish to first compile a list of all employee/contractor groups and then define their respective aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. Alternatively, the aerodrome operator could review work descriptions, standard operating procedures, directives, contracts, etc. to identify the aerodrome-related security roles and

responsibilities, and then list the employees or contractors responsible for them.

Employee groups are persons directly employed by the aerodrome operator. Employee groups with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities may include:

- Aerodrome management, including the security manager(s);
- Aerodrome security official(s);
- Aerodrome security staff (e.g., security guards, security supervisors, security response officers, etc.);
- Security operations centre staff; and/or
- Maintenance staff (e.g., those who are responsible for the restricted area identity card or closed-circuit television systems, or maintaining screening equipment, etc.).

Contractor groups are persons contracted by the aerodrome operator. Contractor groups with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities may include:

- Personnel controlling access to/from the restricted area such as contracted security guard companies;
- Police of jurisdiction contracted by the aerodrome authority to respond to security incidents; and/or
- Maintenance staff (e.g., those who are responsible with the restricted area identity card or closed-circuit television systems, or maintaining screening equipment, etc.).

4.2.2 DOCUMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The aerodrome operator is required to document the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to each employee and/or contractor group. These security roles and responsibilities may already exist within job descriptions. Please note that participating in the security awareness program is not a security-related role and responsibility.

4.2.3 COMMUNICATING SECURITY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The aerodrome operator is required to communicate aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities to those employees and/or contractor groups who have been assigned these duties.

Depending on the size of the aerodrome and scale of the operation, the aerodrome operator may wish to develop a process for communicating aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities to their employees and contractors. They may wish to:

- Review work descriptions, standard operating procedures, directives, etc. for employees and contractors to determine which groups have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;
- Define and document any security training requirements;
- Develop a communications plan or strategy to communicate assigned aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities; and/or
- Have employees and contractors sign-off on their assigned aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities to demonstrate their awareness of those roles and responsibilities.

4.2.4 VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

Aviation security inspectors will need to review the documented aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities for security personnel during their inspection. The inspectors will:

- Review the types of employees and/or contractor groups the aerodrome operator has identified as having aerodrome security-related roles and responsibilities;
- Review a sample of the documented roles and responsibilities; and
- Discuss observations.

Sample Employee Group – Manager, Airport Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Coordinate and oversee security controls and procedures at the aerodrome;
- Act as the principal contact between the operator of the aerodrome and the Minister with respect to security matters, including the airport security program;
- Serve as the main contact for all security-related issues, incidents and activities;
- Serve as the liaison point for all security-related issues on behalf of the aerodrome with Transport Canada, CATSA, tenants, RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, etc.;
- Coordinate the activities of the Airport Security Committee;

- Manage the aerodrome security personnel and contract security personnel and oversee their activities;
- Deliver security awareness training for aerodrome employees, tenant and contract personnel;
- Protect security-sensitive information such as publications, personal and confidential files, closed circuit television recordings and audio logger records;
- Maintain security vigilance at all times and report any/all potential security issues immediately; and
- Develop, implement and have a comprehensive knowledge of the airport security program, airport emergency plan and security procedures.

Sample Contractor Group – Operations Clerk, Pass Control Office

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Perform pass office duties to ensure all applicants are properly processed;
- Keep all protected files, records and restricted area identity card equipment secure as per established guidelines;
- Immediately notify the security official of any denied or cancelled security clearances;
- Have a working knowledge of the airport security program, airport emergency plan and security procedures; and
- Promote and participate in the security awareness program.

4.3 AERODROME-RELATED SECURITY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES – SECURITY OFFICIAL

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 4, s. 111
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 4, s. 269
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 4, s. 424

Interpretation:

A security official of an aerodrome is an individual who is responsible for
 (a) *coordinating and overseeing security controls and procedures at the aerodrome; and*
 (b) *acting as the principal contact between the operator of the aerodrome and the Minister with respect to security matters, including the airport security program.*

These sections within the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* outline expected duties of a security official. It is recommended that these functions be included within the documented roles and responsibilities of the aerodrome operator's security official(s).

The security official falls under the definition of 'aerodrome security personnel' within the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*. Therefore, the aerodrome operator is required to document the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to the security official. When defining and documenting the security roles and responsibilities of the security official(s), the aerodrome operator should consider not only the duties that meet the regulatory requirements, but any other security needs and expectations that the aerodrome operator may have of its security official(s).

NOTE: Regulatory requirements for security managers are currently found in the *Aerodrome Security Measures*. If the duties of a security manager and security official overlap, the aerodrome operator should refer to the requirements for a security manager found in the *Aerodrome Security Measures* when documenting security roles and responsibilities of the security official(s).

The aerodrome operator may want to consider assigning the security official the following duties:

- Developing and reviewing Standard Operating Procedures and/or Post Orders;
- Developing and delivering the security awareness program;
- Developing and delivering security training for employees and contractors with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;
- Providing oversight of day-to-day security operations at the aerodrome;
- Monitoring and evaluating the results of corrective actions related to security risks, incidents, and breaches;
- Maintaining effective coordination and liaison with other areas of the aerodrome operation, primary security line partners and tenants, Transport Canada, and other relevant law enforcement authorities/response organizations;

- Developing and/or monitoring the implementation of procedures for the rapid and systematic collection and sharing of information between the security official and other organizations;
- Ensuring the protection of security-sensitive information;
- Managing or supporting the implementation of security plans and exercises;
- Conducting quality assurance/control reviews to ensure effectiveness of security processes and procedures;
- Participating in the multi-agency advisory committee, aerodrome security committee and/or other forum; and
- Providing advice and guidance to the aerodrome operator on the development, implementation, and maintenance of the airport security program.

Sample Employee Group – Security Official(s)

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Coordinate and oversee aerodrome security controls and procedures;
- Act as the main contact between the operator of the aerodrome and the Minister with respect to security matters, including the airport security program;
- Serve as the main contact at the aerodrome for all security-related issues, incidents and activities (standby duties required to provide availability to Transport Canada 24 hours a day/7 days a week);
- Serve as liaison for all security-related issues on behalf of the aerodrome with the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Transport Canada, tenants, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canada Border Services Agency, etc.;
- Manage and oversee/direct the activities of the aerodrome and contract security personnel;
- Maintain security vigilance at all times and immediately report any/all potential security issues;
- Deliver security awareness training for aerodrome and contract security personnel;
- Protect security-sensitive information; and
- Develop, manage, and/or support security exercise, as well as exercising the effectiveness of the airport's security plan.

4.4 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL

As a member state, Canada conforms to the International Civil Aviation Organization's standards. This includes ensuring that persons implementing security controls at aerodromes possess the abilities required to perform their duties. This is done by including requirements for aerodrome security personnel training in our domestic regulatory framework. Canada has adopted the International Civil Aviation Organization standards for Annex 17 and has included the following in the overall regulatory framework:

- a. Access control;
- b. Surveillance and patrolling;
- c. Detect presence of unauthorized person(s) in vehicle through visual, internal and external inspection;
- d. Procedures for aerodrome supplies;
- e. Conducting aviation security training;
- f. Conducting quality control measures; and
- g. Aviation security management.

4.5 SECURITY TRAINING VS. SECURITY AWARENESS

While there may be some overlap between **security training** and **security awareness**, they are not the same. Security awareness is meant to engage aerodrome employees and relevant individuals in the aerodrome community who must comply with security rules at the aerodrome. It is intended to promote security vigilance and to ensure awareness of one's responsibility to aviation security. Such topics include: access to the restricted area, responsibilities for the holder of a restricted area identity card, how to report security incidents, etc. More information regarding security awareness can be found in Section 5.3.

The expectation of security training is to ensure that aerodrome security personnel are competent in performing tasks related to their assigned aerodrome-security related roles and responsibilities. Therefore, training must include instruction on how to perform these tasks (e.g. following standard operating procedures, post

orders, the use of various security systems and equipment, etc.).

If employees and contractors with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities have already received more comprehensive aerodrome-related security training, the aerodrome operator may decide that they do not need to participate in the airport's security awareness program. In some cases, these employees and contractors may actually develop and deliver the security awareness program themselves.

4.6 INITIAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 4, s. 115 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 4, s. 271 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 4, s. 426 (1), (2), and (3)

Initial training:

The operator of an aerodrome must ensure that a member of the aerodrome security personnel does not carry out an aerodrome-related security role or responsibility at the aerodrome unless the member has received initial training in relation to that role or responsibility.

Training elements:

Initial training for aerodrome security personnel must include instruction and evaluation in relation to the topics set out below that are relevant to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel:

- (a) international instruments respecting aviation security, the aviation security provisions of the Act and regulatory requirements;*
- (b) the security controls and procedures at the aerodrome where the personnel are employed;*
- (c) systems and equipment at the aerodrome;*
- (d) an overview of threats to aviation security and acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation;*
- (e) the recognition of goods that are listed or described in TP 14628 or that pose an immediate threat to aviation security; and*

(f) the actions to be taken by the personnel in response to a threat to aviation security or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

Grandfathering:

Aerodrome security personnel who are employed at the aerodrome on the day on which this section comes into force are exempted from initial training in relation to any topic for which they have already received training.

4.6.1 INITIAL TRAINING - REQUIRED ELEMENTS

The aerodrome operator is expected to ensure that security training is provided to all of its employees and contractors who have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. Training is expected to be delivered prior to the employee or contractor being permitted to perform their assigned security roles and responsibilities. Initial training must include instruction and evaluation on the following elements:

1. Instruction on the topics that are relevant⁵ to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the security personnel member (or group), including contracted security personnel. The aerodrome operator should have identified and documented all of the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities for each of their employee and contractor groups when airport security programs were initially introduced. Some examples include:
 - Those who respond to incidents, breaches or emergencies would receive training on the process for responding to aerodrome-related security incidents and breaches, the emergency plan and emergency response procedures, AVSEC levels, and the menu of additional safeguards.
 - Those that control and verify goods and supplies in the sterile area would receive training on stock security and secure supply chain program procedures.

⁵ In this case, "relevant" refers to the topics that correlate directly to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to the individual. Not all security personnel will have the same duties, and each individual should only receive training on those security duties that they themselves perform. For example, access control officers should receive restricted area identity card training, but would not require training on stock security as it is outside the scope of their duties.

- Those who control access to the restricted area would receive training on how access to the restricted area is expected to be achieved, including any post orders for specific access points, verification of restricted area identity cards or other documents of entitlement, Record Identification Number black and/or white lists, how to use the restricted area identity card system, etc.
 - Systems training should be provided to those who monitor access control and alarm systems, or issue restricted area identity cards.
2. International instruments respecting aviation security, the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act* and regulatory requirements (i.e. International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 17 and Standards, *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*, *Aerodrome Security Measures*, *Air Carrier Security Measures*, and *Security Screening Measures*);
 3. The security controls and procedures at the aerodrome where the personnel are employed (i.e. standard operating procedures, post orders, policies, programs, etc. that are relevant to the security duties of the individual);
 4. Systems and equipment at the aerodrome (e.g. restricted area identity cards, closed-circuit television, access control system, baggage handling system, silent alarms, communications systems, etc.);
 5. An overview of threats to aviation security and acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation (e.g. attacks on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001; 2006 terror plot aimed at detonating liquid explosives; etc.);
 6. The recognition of items that are listed or described in TP 14628 (*Prohibited Items List*) or that pose an immediate threat to aviation security; and
 7. The actions that should be taken by the personnel in response to a threat to aviation security or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference with civil aviation (e.g. process for responding to security incidents and breaches, aerodrome emergency plan, etc.) See Sections 5.2 and 11, for more information.

The evaluation of the training must be carried out, documented and retained for each individual security personnel member.

4.6.2 INITIAL TRAINING - EVALUATION

The method of evaluation for the initial training will be decided by the aerodrome operator. For example, evaluation could be a written, oral, or practical test, or a combination of these methods. Written tests, for example, should include at least one question for every security duty the individual is expected to perform. On the other hand, for practical tests, there should be a record of the task and how well the individual performed it.

Both a record of the test and the result for each individual must be retained by the aerodrome operator for at least two years. It is also recommended that any incorrect answers are discussed with the individual before permitting him or her to perform the security duties.

4.6.3 GRANDFATHERING

Employees hired prior to April 15, 2015 will be exempted from initial training in relation to any topic for which they have already received training if the aerodrome operator provides verifiable evidence of the date of hire of each grandfathered employee or contractor. If, for example, the aerodrome operator provided any of the following to Transport Canada, then Transport Canada would consider the aerodrome security personnel members listed as grandfathered and not subject to initial training requirements:

- a copy of a Restricted Area Identity Card request for each aerodrome security personnel member dated prior to April 15, 2015;
- a record for each aerodrome security personnel member that shows that the member was employed at the aerodrome prior to April 15, 2015; or
- a list of aerodrome security personnel members employed at the aerodrome prior to April 15, 2015. It is recommended that the list be signed and dated by the security official. Please note, the list would have to be provided to Transport Canada to be used as a reference during inspections.

If an aerodrome operator is unable to supply these types of information, the aerodrome security

personnel could not be considered grandfathered and would be subject to initial training per the regulations.

If an aerodrome security personnel member changes employment from one aerodrome to another, he or she would be subject to initial training requirements at the new aerodrome even if he or she was considered grandfathered at the previous aerodrome. The regulatory requirement clearly states that grandfathering is only possible for members employed at the aerodrome on the day on which the requirement comes into force. In other words, an aerodrome security personnel member who changes employment from one aerodrome to another cannot transfer his or her exemption from the initial training requirements. While training cannot be transferred from one aerodrome to another, it may be appropriate for these individuals – dependent on their background – to receive a more condensed version of the training.

Employees hired on and after April 15, 2015 are subject to the initial training requirements set out in the regulations.

4.7 FOLLOW-UP TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 4, s. 116 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 4, s. 272 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 4, s. 427 (1), (2), and (3)

Follow-up training:

The operator of an aerodrome must ensure that aerodrome security personnel receive follow-up training when any of the following circumstances arise:

- (a) a change is made in the aviation security provisions of the Act or in regulatory requirements and the change is relevant to the aerodrome related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel;*

- (b) a change is made in the security controls and procedures at the aerodrome where the personnel are employed and the change is relevant to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel;*
- (c) a new or modified action is to be taken by the personnel in response to a threat to aviation security or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference with civil aviation; and*
- (d) a significant risk or an emerging trend in aviation security is identified to the operator by the Minister and the risk or trend is relevant to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel.*

Follow-up training:

The operator of an aerodrome must ensure that a member of the aerodrome security personnel receives follow-up training when the Minister or the operator identifies a shortcoming in the member's performance when the member is carrying out security controls or following security procedures at the aerodrome.

Training elements:

Follow-up training must include

- (a) a review of any initial-training element related to the circumstance set out in subsection (1) or (2) that gave rise to the follow-up training; and*
- (b) instruction and evaluation in relation to that circumstance.*

4.7.1 FOLLOW-UP TRAINING - TRIGGERS

Follow-up training is intended to be on-going. Rather than defining a frequency for follow-up training, triggers have been included in the requirements. These triggers could occur at any time or frequency. When one of the triggers is identified, follow-up training will need to be delivered to the security personnel whose aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities are affected by the trigger. The triggers are:

1. Any change made in the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act* or in regulatory requirements, if the change is relevant to the aerodrome-related security

roles and responsibilities of the personnel. This may include changes to the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012, Aerodrome Security Measures, Special Location Measures* or the introduction of any new special measure, security order, or exemption.

2. Changes made in the security controls and/or procedures at the aerodrome, if the change is relevant to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel. For example: the updating of any plans or programs in place at the aerodrome such as the airport security program, stock security program, the addition of a new plan, program or procedure or the implementation or update of new security equipment such as access control, closed-circuit television or baggage screening system, etc.
3. If a new or modified action is to be taken by security personnel in response to a threat to aviation security or an act or attempted act of unlawful interference with civil aviation, such as updates to the airport emergency plan or menu of additional safeguards. For example, if access control procedures change, the relevant security personnel must receive follow-up training on the new procedures.
4. If a significant risk or an emerging trend in aviation security is identified to the aerodrome operator by the Minister and the risk or trend is relevant to the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the personnel. For example, the 2006 terror plot aimed at detonating liquid explosives led to restrictions for liquids, aerosols and gels and initially required an increased alert at aerodromes across Canada that led to new regulatory requirements.
5. If a concern or issue in a security personnel member's performance of one or more of their aerodrome-related security roles or responsibilities is identified by the Minister or the aerodrome operator, the aerodrome operator must ensure that the member receives follow-up training. For example, if an access control officer were not following the proper

restricted area identity card procedures, he or she would need to receive follow-up training that revisits the areas of shortcoming. Depending on the severity of the shortcoming, it is recommended that the individual be removed from the duty that raised concerns until the follow-up training and re-evaluation have occurred.

Follow-up training should include a review of any initial-training element (listed in Section 4.6.1 above) related to the triggers, above, listed in one through four. If the follow-up training is required due to an identified shortcoming, the follow-up training must include the initial training topic that gave rise to the shortcoming. Follow-up training must include instruction and evaluation in relation to the training delivered.

Should the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of a security personnel member change (e.g. promotion, change in duties or position, etc.), the security personnel member would require training (initial and/or follow-up as applicable) on their new roles and responsibilities prior to them being permitted to perform those new duties.

4.7.2 FOLLOW-UP TRAINING - EVALUATION

The method of evaluation for the follow-up training will be decided by the aerodrome operator. For example, evaluation could be a written, oral, or practical test, or a combination of these methods. Written tests, for example, should include at least one question for every security duty the individual is expected to perform. On the other hand, for practical tests there should be a record of the task and how well the individual performed it.

Both a record of the test and the result for each individual must be retained by the aerodrome operator. It is also recommended that any incorrect answers are discussed with the individual before permitting him or her to perform the security duties.

The content and evaluation of follow-up training must be documented. However, the aerodrome operator only needs to show that the individual received follow-up training in the area of his/her shortcoming. The individual does not need to revisit all of the initial training elements.

4.8 ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 4, s. 117
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 4, s. 273
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 4, s. 428

On-the-job training:

If, at an aerodrome, the initial or follow-up training of aerodrome security personnel includes on-the-job training, the operator of the aerodrome must ensure that the on-the-job training is provided by a person who has received that same training or has significant experience working as a member of the aerodrome security personnel at an aerodrome listed in Schedule 1.

On-the-job training is sometimes called direct instruction. It is one-on-one training at the job site, where someone who knows how to carry out a task shows another person how to perform it. It is probably the most popular method of training because it is inexpensive as it requires only the person who knows how to do the task and the tools required to perform the task. On-the-job training is the easy to arrange and manage. This type of training is highly practical because it takes place on the job.

Where the initial or follow-up training of aerodrome security personnel includes on-the-job training, the aerodrome operator should ensure that the on-the-job training is provided by a person who has received that same training or has significant experience working as an aerodrome security personnel member at an aerodrome. Aviation security inspectors encountering this circumstance may request documentation, in the form of training records, to support the qualifications of the security personnel member who is providing the on-the-job training.

4.9 TRAINING RECORDS, EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS, RETENTION AND MINISTERIAL ACCESS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 4, s. 118 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 4, s. 274 (1), (2), and (3)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 4, s. 429(1), (2), and (3)

Training records:

The operator of an aerodrome must ensure that, for each individual who receives training in accordance with section 115 or 116 [271 or 272, 426 or 427], there is a training record that includes

- (a) the individual's employee group or contractor group, if applicable, and a description of the individual's aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;*
- (b) a description of all the training that the individual has received in accordance with section 115 or 116 [271 or 272, 426 or 427]; and*
- (c) evaluation results for all the training that the individual has received in accordance with section 115 or 116 [271 or 272, 426 or 427].*

Record keeping:

The operator of the aerodrome must keep the training record for at least two years.

Ministerial access:

The operator of the aerodrome must make the training record available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

A training record needs to be kept for each person with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities who receives security training. The training record must include:

- (a) a description of the individual's aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;
- (b) a description of all the training that the individual has received including both initial and follow-up; and
- (c) evaluation results for the initial and all follow-up training that the individual has received.

A typical training record would include a copy of the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of that employee, the dates that training was delivered to the security personnel member, the type of training delivered, and the name of the individual who delivered the training, and a record of any on-the-job training that they have received with the date and the signature of the on-the-job training trainer. The training record must also include copies of any evaluation(s).

The training records must be kept for at least two years for each aerodrome security personnel member and must be made available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

4.10 OTHER GUIDANCE AND ADVICE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY OF AERODROME SECURITY PERSONNEL TRAINING

Airport security programs are intended to be scalable. When developing the training program, the aerodrome operator should consider the size and complexity of the operation at its aerodrome. A large Class 1 aerodrome may have a complex airport security program with numerous systems, procedures, and security personnel. Therefore, the training program at that Class 1 aerodrome should address the complexity of those systems, procedures and various aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the security personnel working there. In comparison, a small Class 3 aerodrome may have less sophisticated systems, procedures and fewer security personnel with simpler aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. Consequently, their training program would be less complex than that of a large Class 1 aerodrome.

In developing the training program for aerodrome security personnel, the aerodrome operator may wish to consult with others who can provide advice on the development of security training programs, such as other aerodrome operators and/or various organizations, such as the Canadian Airports Council or the Regional Community Airports of Canada.

Aerodrome operators developing and implementing aerodrome security training should:

1. Set training goals that reflect and support the overall security policy and goals of the organization and the size, and complexity of the operation:
 - Outline the current regulated aerodrome security requirements;
 - Include relevant aerodrome security procedures and policies;
 - Address the various aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of the security personnel at the aerodrome; and
 - Address the relationship between security and the successful operation of an aerodrome.
2. Use a variety of tools, media, and methods (or a combination of these things) to deliver the training such as:
 - Classroom training;
 - On-the-job/practical training; and/or
 - Electronic or hard copy material to be studied by the security personnel.
3. Administer an evaluation.
4. Document the training program. This way it will make up part of the aerodrome operator's airport security program and will be repeatable and ready to be used when required. This will ensure consistency in the delivery of training, which is good for both those receiving and delivering the training. In the event that the regular trainer becomes unavailable, the documented program can be used by whoever is assigned to take over training, temporarily or permanently.
5. Assess the effectiveness of the security training program by ensuring that it will result in competent security personnel. The effectiveness of the security training program can be determined by written evaluations, on-the-job evaluations, or by assessing the overall security environment and record of the aerodrome. For example: there are no breaches of restricted area because trained and competent access control guards are preventing unauthorized persons from entering.
6. Review the training program routinely (i.e. annually) to ensure that it is current and up-to-date and revise per the triggers as required.

5. AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS*

*Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes

5.1 SECURITY POLICY STATEMENT

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 191
(2) (c) and (d)

Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 347
(2) (c) and (d)

Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 455
(2) (c) and (d)

Program requirements:

As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must:

- (c) have a security policy statement that establishes an overall commitment and direction for aerodrome security and sets out the operator's security objectives;*
- (d) communicate the security policy statement in an accessible manner to all persons who are employed at the aerodrome or who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment;*

When developing a security policy statement that establishes an overall commitment, direction for aerodrome security and sets out the security objectives, the aerodrome operator may wish to:

- Include a commitment to continually improve security practices, risk management principles, and compliance with regulatory security requirements;
- Have the security policy statement visibly endorsed by aerodrome senior management and/or the executive responsible for security;
- Develop security objectives that:
 - *Are precise and at a high enough level to allow for the development of goals and the ability to achieve them; and*
 - *Use action terminology (e.g., to have, to be, to become, to achieve, etc.);*
- Include a high-level direction or course of action showing how security goals will be achieved;
- Establish a review mechanism;
- For ease of use and reference, use clear language and a concise format when developing the security policy statement;
- Be consistent with other internal policies (e.g., safety management system policies, etc.); and
- Develop a security policy statement that is appropriate to the threat environment in which the organization operates as well as the size and complexity of the aerodrome.

Aerodrome operators may also wish to:

- Develop a communication plan/strategy to ensure that the security policy statement is communicated and accessible to all persons who:
 - *Are employed at the aerodrome; and/or*
 - *Require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment (e.g., contractors, delivery personnel, inspectors, ambulance attendants and paramedics, etc.)*
- Determine how to communicate the security policy statement to employees and make it accessible to stakeholders and/or the public, where appropriate (e.g., intranet, Internet, awareness bulletins, newsletters, awareness/training programs, meetings, established committees/forums, etc.);
- Include the aerodrome security objectives set out in the security policy statement in all aerodrome security communications materials, training, and awareness programs;
- Review and align existing and future aerodrome security processes and procedures to ensure they are consistent with the security policy statement; and
- Validate the effectiveness of the policy and the communication method(s) after they are used.

EXAMPLE SECURITY POLICY STATEMENT - ABC AIRPORT

ABC Airport, in partnership with its employees, will operate in a manner that ensures security is a priority and fundamental to ABC Airport's operations. ABC's Senior Management Committee will, therefore, ensure that all decisions about the airport - large and small - take into account the potential impact on the security of our operations.

ABC Airport is committed to being a leader in security and to continually improve security through the following objectives:

- Enhancing cooperation and collaboration with our security partners;
- Promoting a culture of security vigilance and awareness;
- Implementing effective processes and procedures that meet national and international standards and complying with all applicable regulatory requirements;
- Reviewing all security incidents and breaches including implementation of corrective actions and lessons learned; and
- Communicating and informing the airport community regarding security issues.

Achieving these objectives requires the full understanding by everyone in the airport organization (and community) of their security responsibilities and their commitment to fostering a proactive security culture.



J.W. Smith, President & C.E.O. — ABC Airport

AERODROME SECURITY POLICY STATEMENT

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS

- Security is a core business and personal value;
- Security is a source of our competitive advantage;
- We will strengthen our business by making security excellence an integral part of all aerodrome operations; and
- All levels of management are accountable for our security performance, starting with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) / Managing Director.

SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- To have a security culture recognizing that security is paramount;
- To have an operating environment based on effective security communications;
- To be leaders in aerodrome security; and
- To continuously improve upon our security processes and performance.

OUR SECURITY APPROACH

Management Commitment

- Security excellence is a component of our mission;
- Senior leaders will be committed to implementing security practices;
- Senior leaders will hold line management and all employees accountable for security performance;
- Senior leaders and line management will demonstrate their continual commitment to security and the commitment to comply with applicable aerodrome security-related regulatory requirements; and
- Line management will clearly communicate aerodrome-related security roles, responsibilities and expectations to employees.

Responsibility and Accountability of All Employees

- We will recognize security performance;
- Before any work is done, we will make everyone aware of the security rules and processes, as well as their personal responsibility to observe them;
- We will communicate information about security incidents and will share the lessons learned with others in an appropriate manner; and
- Each of us will be concerned for the safety and security of others in our organization.

Auditing for Improvement

- Management will ensure regular security audits are conducted;
- We will focus our audits on critical areas of operations at the aerodrome; and
- Management is committed to the continual improvement of security practices and risk management principles.



M. Fox, President & C.E.O. — DEF Airport

5.1.1 WHO NEEDS TO KNOW?

Security is a broad and shared responsibility across an organization. This is why it is important to widely share an aerodrome's security policy statement.

This includes persons:

- Who routinely access restricted areas (i.e., restricted area identity card holders at Class 1 and Class 2 airports) and persons who work in public areas of the aerodrome;
- Employed by the aerodrome operator; and
- All other personnel employed at the aerodrome or who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their duties.

Examples of persons who routinely access restricted areas (i.e., restricted area identity card holders at Class 1 and Class 2 airports) include:

- Managers, supervisors, and trainers (of all categories of personnel who have aviation security responsibilities);
- Airside safety personnel;
- Aerodrome security response officers;
- Pass and key control staff;
- Emergency operations centre and/or security operations centre personnel;
- Emergency responders including police, commissionaires, explosive detection dog handlers, fire and ambulance personnel;
- Canadian Air Transport Security Authority security officers and managers, security guards (access control);
- Aircraft maintenance personnel, baggage handlers, customer service agents (aerodrome and air carrier), de-icing personnel, ground security coordinators, ramp personnel and fuellers;
- Flight crews; and
- Federal government personnel including Canada Border Services Agency, NAV CANADA, Canadian Forces, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and Transport Canada.
- Examples of persons who work in public areas of the aerodrome include:
 - Consultants;
 - Building maintenance, cargo, and catering personnel;
 - Concessions staff working in the public concourse of terminal buildings;
 - Parking control staff (e.g., parking garage and curbside, etc.); and
 - Primary security line partner staff located in the general aviation area or areas on the primary security line other than in the main terminal.

5.1.2 COMMUNICATION OF SECURITY POLICY STATEMENT

The security policy statement is required to be shared with personnel employed at the aerodrome as well as with those who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment. The security policy statement can be:

- Explained during training or security awareness sessions;
- Placed in plain view in a number of places throughout the aerodrome, such as the administration building entrance, the pass control office, maintenance facility, and fire hall, etc.;
- Posted on an internal and/or external website;
- Included in bulletin or memorandum to aerodrome employees; and/or
- Included in the terms and conditions a restricted area identity card.

5.1.3 ACCESSIBILITY OF SECURITY POLICY STATEMENT

Security policy statements are required to be communicated in an accessible way. For example:

- Alternative media for vision impaired, including verbal instruction (i.e., during the issuance of a restricted area identity card or security awareness briefing), audio recording, and/or Braille;
- Large print posters;
- Notices at different heights; and
- In both official languages (where applicable).

5.2 PROCESS FOR RESPONDING TO SECURITY INCIDENTS AND BREACHES

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (e)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (e)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (e)

Program requirements:

As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must

(e) establish and implement a process for responding to aerodrome-related security incidents and breaches in a coordinated manner that minimizes their impact;

“Response” refers to the processes and/or activities used to react to a security incident or breach and include the point of notification through to a satisfactory conclusion. A response is required to be coordinated with other partners, such as police, security guards or commissionaires, air carriers, Transport Canada and other government departments, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, and primary security line partners that assist in responding to or minimizing the impact of a security incident or breach.

A process may include how to:

- Notify or report the incident or breach;
- Dispatch first responders;
- Coordinate with the various security partners involved in the incident/breach;
- Link to a standard operating procedure(s) regarding incidents and breaches;
- Describe incident management or emergency protocols or responses when a standard operating procedure can not immediately resolve the incident or breach;
- Record the incident (e.g., an incident report to record the details and the actions taken for resolution, etc.);
- Follow-up (e.g., a debrief/hotwash including conducting a gap analysis or best practices, etc.); and
- Implement any action required, including further corrective actions, phased action plan and/or revisions to the process.

Sample - Process

1. Notify the aerodrome operator that a security incident or breach is occurring or has been identified. This could be done using an aerodrome emergency number. A large aerodrome may have this number go to its security operations control centre, while a smaller aerodrome may have it go directly to the security official or security guard desk.
2. The aerodrome operator notifies aerodrome security and/or first responders of pre-determined protocols.
3. The aerodrome operator, aerodrome security personnel and first responders implement their standard operating procedures for breaches/incidents, including notifying Transport Canada immediately (as required by regulation) and involving tenants/partners where required.

4. The aerodrome operator, security staff, contracted police and any other responders investigate and deal with (i.e., take corrective action) the breach/incident as appropriate.
5. Aerodrome operator may default to a higher-level response as required.
6. When the incident/breach requires actions that fall beyond the scope of the standard operating procedure, the aerodrome operator may decide to:
 - Engage a team, comprised of affected stakeholders, to assist in assessing the situation;
 - Add representation from police of jurisdiction, Transport Canada, affected air carrier(s), the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, and other partners and tenants as required; and/or
 - Have the team conduct a situational threat and risk assessment, which: document);
 - i. Conducts a comprehensive review of the incident/breach;
 - ii. Assesses the threat and risk level;
 - iii. Reassesses the threat and risk level as new information becomes available;
 - iv. Recommends appropriate corrective actions with the assistance of the team (for more information on corrective actions see Section 13 of this
 - v. Activates and monitors any corrective actions; and
 - vi. Determines whether or not the breach or incident is satisfactorily concluded or resolved.

NOTE: Incident response may include implementing the *Incident Management and Emergency Response Procedures for Screening Checkpoints*, which are in place at most Class 1 aerodromes. At some aerodromes the checkpoints have been expanded to include areas other than screening checkpoints. The procedures could also be used at Class 2 or 3 aerodromes. Aerodrome operators can get a copy of the procedures to develop this process through the Regional Director of Security.

When developing response procedures, aerodrome operators may:

- Adopt procedures and best practices for collecting, compiling, documenting, and analyzing all pertinent information for quality,

completeness, and effectiveness in a timely fashion;

- Develop and maintain a list of organizations/ individuals responsible for response activities at the aerodrome;
- Clearly define roles and responsibilities and the lines of authority;
- Establish an assessment team to respond to security incidents and breaches;
- Develop rapid notification processes, procedures, and systems;
- Keep records; and/or
- Review and analyze incident or breach trends to identify lessons learned and best practices.

5.3 SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAM

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (f)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (f)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (f)

Program requirements:

(2) As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must

(f) establish and implement a security awareness program that promotes a culture of security vigilance and awareness among the following persons:

(i) persons who are employed at the aerodrome,

(ii) crew members who are based at the aerodrome, and

(iii) persons, other than crew members, who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment;

Security awareness engages employees, contractors, and relevant players within the airport community in maintaining security vigilance and ensures that they are aware of their responsibility to aviation security. The aerodrome operator must include all persons employed at the aerodrome or who require access to the aerodrome in their security awareness program. The program should include awareness of surroundings, familiarity with security issues and procedures, as well as response

information (e.g., restricted area identity card and temporary pass terms of issue, access to restricted area, airport emergency number, unattended items in public areas, etc.).

To foster a culture of security awareness and vigilance, the security awareness program should be kept up-to-date and repeated periodically for all employees and contractors. For example, an aerodrome operator could link the renewal of security documents, such as a restricted area identity card, to recurrent security awareness program participation.

The aerodrome operator may decide that those people who have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities do not need to participate in the airport's security awareness program because they have already received more comprehensive aerodrome-related security training. In some cases, these people may deliver the security awareness program.

Aerodrome operators developing and implementing a security awareness program may wish to:

1. Set security awareness program goals that reflect and support the overall security policy and goals of the organization and:
 - Outline the current security requirements; and
 - Identify the program's goals including promoting a culture of security vigilance and awareness.
2. Identify aerodrome employees, contractors and others who should receive security awareness. Awareness training may vary depending on the nature of the roles and responsibilities - addressing the specific needs for each group.
3. Make sure security awareness includes personnel who need access to the restricted area as well as those working within the public areas of the facility.

Examples of some of the persons who need access to the restricted area:

- Ramp agents;
- Catering personnel;
- Customer service agents;
- Access control;
- Aircraft maintenance personnel;

- Baggage handlers;
- De-icing personnel;
- Fuelers; and
- Pilots and flight attendants.

Examples of some of the persons who have access within the public areas of the airport:

- Consultants;
- Building maintenance personnel;
- Cargo handlers;
- Concessions staff working in the public area of the facility;
- Catering staff; and
- Delivery personnel.

While the airport's security awareness program should include all personnel who require access to the airport, one of its primary objectives should be to include employees and contractors who would receive no other security training.

4. Ensure employees receive information about:
 - The purpose of a security awareness program and the applicable regulatory requirements;
 - The Aerodrome Security Policy Statement and its relevance to the employees and others who access the aerodrome;
 - The risks to physical assets and sensitive information;
 - The indicators of suspicious or unusual behaviour in an aviation environment and how to report them;
 - Procedures for receiving, retaining, disposing of, and disclosing sensitive security information;
 - Procedures for reporting and responding to security incidents;
 - Relevant aerodrome security procedures and policies;
 - The need to maintain a culture of security awareness and vigilance at the aerodrome; and
 - The relationship between security and the successful operation of an aerodrome.
5. Encourage employees to identify security gaps that may need to be addressed or make suggestions for improvements to the security awareness program or other security policies and procedures. Explain the process for reporting incidents, including who to inform, the number to call, and details to record.
6. Have a recognition program to promote security vigilance and awareness by rewarding individuals who consistently meet or exceed expectations.
7. Use a variety of tools, media and methods to deliver the awareness program such as:
 - Live awareness sessions;
 - Online or hard copy awareness material that each person must review;
 - Emails, posters, pamphlets, bulletins, and videos; and/or
 - Security awareness sessions linked to receiving a restricted area identity card.
8. Include security awareness in orientation for new employees and implement a system to provide ongoing and refresher sessions regarding security awareness.
9. Assess the effectiveness of the security awareness program:
 - Determine the current baseline for security awareness at an aerodrome;
 - Identify program goals;
 - Track progress toward achieving goals;
 - Review incident reporting and monitoring to note any changes or trends;
 - Evaluate and test (i.e. during and after awareness program delivery); and
 - Adjust the program as necessary.
10. Document the awareness program and deliver or repeat it consistently.

Please note, Security Measures and other material marked unauthorized disclosure prohibited (UDP) **should not** be included in the security awareness program. Only persons **who have a need and right to know** should have access to *Security Measures* and UDP material. In these cases, *Security Measures* and UDP material should be provided directly, by coaching, in a meeting, etc. Because they are security sensitive, *Security Measures* and UDP material should be dealt with in a controlled manner and should not be placed online, in common documents, etc. Note, section 4.79 of the *Aeronautics Act* prohibits the disclosure of the substance of *Security Measures*.

5.4 SECURITY INFORMATION PROCESSES/ REQUIREMENTS

5.4.1 RISK INFORMATION ASSESSMENT AND DISSEMINATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (g)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (g)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (g)

Program requirements:

As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must

(g) assess risk information and disseminate it within the operator's organization for the purpose of informed decision-making about aviation security;

The *Treasury Board of Canada - Integrated Risk Management Framework* describes risk as “the uncertainty that surrounds future events and outcomes. It is the expression of the likelihood and impact of an event with the potential to influence the achievement of an organization’s objectives.”

Risk is assessed against the identified threat, taking into consideration the likelihood that the event will occur, its potential impact, and possible mitigation to the risk. Aerodrome operators must ensure that risk information is assessed in a coordinated manner and shared with decision-makers in a timely manner.

The expected outcome of this requirement is that the aerodrome operator will assess risk information and share the information with the relevant employees within the organization who have decision-making authority for aviation security matters. Information related to risk may be gathered internally, received from security partners, and/or government departments and agencies.

Risk information related to aviation security is considered sensitive information and is required to be handled accordingly. See Section 5.4.2, below, on Security Information Process Requirements.

Examples of Risk Information:

- Results of airport security risk assessments;
- Information received from the multi-agency advisory committee, security committee or other aerodrome security committees;
- Analysis of information generated from incidents at the aerodrome;
- Information received from law enforcement or other security partners (i.e. local, national, or international) that include both threat and likelihood; and
- Aviation security risk information (e.g. global security incidents, global threat conditions, specific threat against the aerodrome, etc.).

Aerodrome operators developing their processes and procedures for assessing and disseminating risk information for the purpose of informed decision-making may wish to:

- Consider which processes and procedures would work best for the sharing of sensitive information within their organization;
- Define and document a process outlining how risk information will flow within their operation. For example:
 - *Clearly identify the individual(s)/position(s) responsible for making informed decisions about aviation security-related issues; and*
 - *Ensure that the individual(s) is aware of the process and his/her responsibilities within it;*
- Establish a point-of-contact (e.g., security operations control centre, aerodrome security official, etc.) that will be responsible for overseeing risk information;
- Develop and implement the process;
- Keep a record of decisions that includes the reason(s) for the decision; and/or
- In order to determine if additional actions are needed, review the processes that were implemented and the risk-based decisions that were made.

Sample - Method

Any method for assessing and disseminating risk information can be scaled to the complexity and scope of the aerodrome's operation. For example, a large Class 1 aerodrome may choose a more comprehensive methodology than a Class 3 aerodrome.

Assign roles and responsibilities for receiving, assessing, and disseminating risk information to those who have the knowledge to assess the risk

information. This information is then required to be shared with persons with the proper decision-making authority.

1. Aerodrome receives or identifies threat and/or risk information.
2. The risk information is provided or communicated to the person(s) responsible for analysis.
3. Analyze the information and consider:
 - Who has a legitimate need to know the information?
 - Based on the information, what kinds of decisions need to be made?
4. Document the analysis process, findings, and recommendations.
5. Provide the analysis and recommendations to a senior official of the aerodrome operator to:
 - Prioritize the risk information (i.e., new risks vs. existing risks);
 - Discuss with other affected groups as required; and
 - Decide on corrective action(s)/risk management strategy and next steps, if necessary.
6. Share information with those individuals who have decision-making authority for aviation security within the operation.

5.4.2 SECURITY INFORMATION PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (h), (i), and (j)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (h), (i), and (j)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (h), (i) and (j)

Program requirements:

(2) As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must

(h) establish and implement a process for receiving, retaining, disclosing and disposing of sensitive information respecting aviation security in order to protect the information from unauthorized access;

(i) identify sensitive information respecting aviation security and receive, retain, disclose

and dispose of sensitive information respecting aviation security in a manner that protects the information from unauthorized access;

(j) disclose sensitive information respecting aviation security to the following persons if they have been assigned aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities and require the information to carry out those roles and responsibilities:

(i) persons who are employed at the aerodrome, and

(ii) persons who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment;

The above provisions set out the requirements for handling sensitive aviation security information, including;

- Receipt;
- Classification;
- Retention;
- Storage;
- Dissemination;
- Disclosure; and
- Disposal.

Aerodrome operators may be provided with classified or protected information from Government of Canada partners, such as Transport Canada. The Government of Canada uses specific guidelines when dealing with sensitive information. These guidelines are produced by the Treasury Board Secretariat and are entitled *Guideline for Employees of the Government of Canada: Information Management (IM) Basics*.⁶ Aerodrome operators may wish to consult these guidelines when developing their processes and when handling government classified or protected information.

Examples of sensitive aviation security information:

- Security measures, interim orders, and other security requirements (e.g., unauthorized disclosure prohibited, etc.);
- Security notices issued by Transport Canada;

⁶ (<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=16557>).

- Aviation security assessments and associated risk management strategies;
- Aviation security threat or risk information;
- Aviation security emergency plans and procedures;
- Airport security program information; and
- Meeting summaries and records of decisions of an aerodrome security committee(s) or multi-agency advisory committee related to security (dependent upon sensitivity of information).

To conform to the regulations, an aerodrome operator is required to establish and follow a process for keeping security information confidential. The aerodrome operator is required to show that confidential security information is handled in a secure manner at all times, and that information is protected from unauthorized access. A sample process is included below.

An overall process for PROTECTING sensitive information may include:

- Receiving sensitive information;
- Logging receipt of sensitive information in a register;
- Classifying the information based on level of sensitivity and setting the retention period;
- Determining if the information needs to be shared immediately and with whom;
- Disclosing information to persons who have a legitimate need and right to know;
- Logging the disclosure of the sensitive information in a register;
- Storing the sensitive information as set out in procedures until the end of the retention period;
- Disposing of sensitive information; and
- Logging the disposal of the sensitive information in a register.

An aerodrome operator developing a process for RECEIVING sensitive information may want to consider:

- Who is responsible for receiving sensitive information?
- Is the information received recorded in a log?
- Do these people have a need and right to know the information?
- Which people/organizations need to receive the sensitive information from the operator/partner?

- Has a list of those who can receive sensitive information been developed? If so, is the list reviewed and updated on a regular basis? If so by whom?
- What training is required for receiving and protecting sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the receipt of information?
- How is the information processed?
 - *Identify and mark the sensitivity of the information received based on pre-defined levels of sensitivity;*
 - *Identify the urgency of the information;*
 - *Limit the number of copies distributed; and*
 - *Determine the need to retain the sensitive information once disclosed.*

An aerodrome operator developing a process for RETAINING sensitive information may want to consider:

- Who is responsible for keeping sensitive records?
- How and where are sensitive records stored/protected (e.g., hard copy and/or electronically on a secure network)?⁷
- Are there special access controls for the locations and/or systems where sensitive information is being stored?
- How should sensitive records be handled when in use?
- What training is required for keeping sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the storage of sensitive information?

An aerodrome operator developing a process for DISCLOSING sensitive information may want to consider:

- How is sensitive information disclosed or transmitted?
- What medium will be used for disclosure (e.g., paper, electronic, etc.)?
- What security options for disclosure are available (e.g., double envelope, encryption, etc.)?
- Who needs to know this information to carry out their aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities? Persons may include those:
 - *Employed at the aerodrome; and*

⁷ Please note that sensitive information from the Minister or his delegates should not be saved or forwarded electronically. For example, sensitive information from the Minister could be accessed on SRAS or stored as a hard copy in a secure cabinet.

- *Who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment.*
- Is giving sensitive information to persons on a “need-to-know basis” consistent with the person’s security roles and responsibilities and/or based on pre-defined levels of sensitivities?
- Who has adequate security clearance to receive sensitive information?
- What training is required for those authorized to disclose security information?
- How does the organization record the disclosure of sensitive information?

An aerodrome operator developing a process for **DISPOSING** of sensitive information may want to consider:

- What storage and disposal timeframes will be adequate for the information?
- Who will dispose of the sensitive information?
- Where and how is the information to be disposed of (e.g., shredding)?
- What training is required for those disposing of sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the disposal of sensitive information?

Special Notes about Access to Information:

- Any information provided to Transport Canada or other federal departments is subject to the *Access to Information Act*. The department is sensitive to industry concerns related to the potential release of an aerodrome operators’ sensitive third party aviation security information.
- Under subsection 20 (1) of the *Access to Information Act*, Transport Canada must refuse to disclose third-party information related to financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, **but only if the third party has consistently treated the information as confidential and has provided that information to the department in confidence.** In order for Transport Canada to treat an aerodrome operator’s information as a third-party confidence (should it ever become the subject of an *Access to Information* request), it is helpful for an aerodrome operator to have and follow an internal process for protecting, receiving, retaining, disclosing, and disposing of sensitive information. Transport Canada has additional discretion under the *Access to Information Act* to exempt security-related information where the disclosure of that information could:

- *Adversely affect the conduct of international affairs; the defence of Canada or an allied country; or Canada’s ability to counteract intelligence operations or subversive activities targeted towards Canada or its allies (section 15); or*
- *Compromise the security of facilities, computer systems (section 16 (2)).*

NOTE: The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* has clear restrictions on when sensitive information can be disclosed, and prohibits disclosure unless it is for the purposes of implementing or meeting an aviation security regulatory requirement, as detailed in the next section.

5.4.3 DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY-SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 213
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 380
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 484

Prohibition:

A person other than the Minister must not disclose security-sensitive information that is created or used under this Division unless the disclosure is required by law or is necessary to comply or facilitate compliance with the aviation security provisions of the Act, regulatory requirements or the requirements of an emergency direction.

Aerodrome operators should keep this prohibition in mind when developing processes and procedures for disclosing security-sensitive information. Disclosure to persons must be limited to the extent required in order to meet aviation security requirements, and should be adapted and/or appropriate to the security roles and responsibilities of the persons receiving the information.

Government of Canada Information Management Criteria:

Classified information refers to the *national interest*. It concerns the defence and maintenance of Canada’s social, political and economic stability. There are three levels of classified information:

1. **Top secret:** A very limited amount of compromised information could cause *exceptionally grave injury* to the national interest.
2. **Secret:** Compromise could cause *serious injury* to the national interest.
3. **Confidential:** Compromise could cause *limited injury* to the national interest.

Protected information refers to specific provisions of the *Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act* and applies to sensitive personal, private, and business information.

1. **Protected C:** Compromise of a very limited amount of information could result in exceptionally grave injury, such as loss of life.
2. **Protected B:** Compromise could result in grave injury, such as loss of reputation or competitive advantage.
3. **Protected A:** Compromise could result in limited injury.

NOTE: Aerodrome operators should assign and explain the roles and responsibilities for protecting sensitive information to persons who have a legitimate need and right to know the information before implementing the process.

5.5 SCALED MAP OF THE AERODROME

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (k)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (k)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (k)

Program requirements:

(2) As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must

(k) have a current scale map of the aerodrome that identifies all restricted areas, security barriers and restricted area access points;

NOTE: This is not a new requirement for aerodrome operators—there was an existing requirement for having a scaled map of the aerodrome in Part 3, section 68 of the previous *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations* (SOR/2000-111).

When developing a scaled map, aerodrome operators may want to:

- Identify all restricted area access points and how they are controlled (e.g., restricted area identity card verification and/or alternate identity verification process/controls, etc.);
- Identify airside and groundside areas critical to aerodrome operations along with a brief description of each (e.g., fuel farms, ventilation systems, parking facilities, power supplies, communications and navigation equipment, control tower, fire hall, security operations control centre, and police office, etc.);
- Clearly identify the aerodrome’s primary security line within and outside the air terminal building, including what barriers are in use (e.g., fencing, buildings as a barrier, etc.);
- Mark the location of the aerodrome primary security line partners and other tenants;
- Indicate aircraft parking locations (including isolation areas); and
- Have a way to keep the map current by updating any changes to the primary security line, access points, tenants, etc.

NOTE:

- While the regulation **may appear** to suggest that an aerodrome operator must have only one “scaled map,” be assured that either one or more maps are acceptable, based on what is most effective and manageable for an aerodrome operator.
- Include the name of the municipality/region where the aerodrome is located, as well as the aerodrome’s official address, telephone number and identification code.
- Aerodrome operators are required to provide the map to the Minister upon request.

5.6 DOCUMENTATION OF AVIATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

5.6.1 DOCUMENTATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AVIATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 191 (2) (I)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 347 (2) (I)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 455 (2) (I)

Program requirements:

(2) As part of its airport security program, the operator of an aerodrome must:

(I) document how the operator achieves compliance with the aviation security provisions of the Act and the regulatory requirements that apply to the operator.

NOTE: A sample table listing the topics of the current aviation security requirements found within the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* and the *Aerodrome Security Measures* is available, but is not included in this document as it contains sensitive information from the *Aerodrome Security Measures*.⁸ Aerodrome operators can access a copy of the table (see Annex A) on Transport Canada's Security Regulatory Advisory System (SRAS) or through their Transport Canada regional office.

Documenting compliance ensures that the aerodrome operator understands and has written security systems, procedures, and protocols in place to comply with regulatory requirements. An aerodrome operator should systematically review all aviation security regulatory requirements and integrate them into the management of its security in order to fulfill its legal obligation. An aerodrome operator does not have to have or need to create a single, comprehensive document detailing every aspect of its operations and how these link to aviation security regulatory requirements.

Transport Canada recommends that aerodrome operators complete a systematic review of all aviation security regulatory requirements in order to:

- Group regulatory requirements into security component areas that are relevant to its operations (see sample groups in Annex A);
- List the regulatory requirements to be met for each group;
- Compare the regulatory requirements with existing written material (e.g., policies, procedures, training materials, post orders, operations manuals, etc.);
- Document generally how compliance is being achieved (e.g., if there is a change in personnel or operations is there sufficient written information within the system, policy, and/or procedure to ensure continued compliance with the regulatory requirement, etc.);
- Reference/link related material and/or where the material can be found; and
- Where the aerodrome operator notices gaps in the documentation supporting compliance in a particular group (e.g. access control, pass control, etc.) consider developing additional written material.

Transport Canada expects that most aerodromes operators' existing written material will demonstrate that the aerodrome operators know and are applying all aviation security regulatory requirements. For example, if an aerodrome operator has an operations manual or standard operating procedures that detail actions to be taken in the event of a security breach or incident, the information contained in the document would likely satisfy the requirement to document compliance. Aerodrome operators can refer to Sample Group 5 (in Annex A) and Division 2 (titled "Threats and Incidents") under Parts 4, 5, and 6 of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* to ensure that documents conform to the regulatory requirements.

Transport Canada expects that an aerodrome operator will keep its documentation up-to-date with aviation security regulatory requirements. This includes addressing changes to the regulatory requirements in the relevant security material (e.g., policies, procedures, training materials, post orders, operations manuals, etc.).

⁸ The *Aerodrome Security Measures* are made pursuant to section 4.73 of the *Aeronautics Act* and are prohibited from being disclosed to unauthorized persons pursuant to section 4.79 of the Act.

It is considered a best practice to review/audit compliance with the provisions of the regulations on a continuous basis, and document the findings of these reviews. To see a sample audit, please refer to Appendix 5.1.

To ensure continued compliance, aerodrome operators should:

- Keep documented compliance current; and
- Ensure that it addresses any changes to aviation security regulatory requirements, the airport security program, or aerodrome security policy and procedures.

5.6.2 RETENTION OF INFORMATION AND PROVISION TO MINISTER

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 193

Documentation:

- (1) The operator of an aerodrome must
- (a) keep documentation related to its airport security risk assessment and any review of it for at least five years;
 - (b) keep documentation related to its strategic airport security plan and any amendment to it for at least five years; and
 - (c) keep all other documentation related to its airport security program for at least two years.

Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 348

Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 456

Documentation:

- (1) The operator of an aerodrome must
- (a) keep documentation related to its menu of additional safeguards and any amendments to it for at least five years;
 - (b) if applicable, keep documentation related to its airport security risk assessment and any review of it for at least five years;
 - (c) if applicable, keep documentation related to its strategic airport security plan and any amendment to it for at least five years; and
 - (d) keep all other documentation related to its airport security program for at least two years.

Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 193

Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 348

Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 456

Ministerial access:

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must make the documentation available to the Minister on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

Documentation related to the airport security program must be:

- Kept for at least two years; and
- Made available to the Minister upon request.

If an aerodrome operator has requested and received information from their primary security line partners in support of the aerodrome's airport security program, this information should be retained for at least two years by the aerodrome operator. Note that operators have the authority to request this information from their partners under sub-sections 231 (1), 374 (1), and 481 (1) of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

APPENDIX 5.1 SAMPLE REGULATORY SECURITY COMPLIANCE AUDIT

Regulatory requirement	Related aerodrome document	Date verified and name of reviewer	Findings	Corrective action (if required)	Corrective action completed: Date and time

6. SECURITY COMMITTEE*

*Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 195

Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 350

Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 458

Security committee:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must have a security committee or other working group or forum that

(a) advises the operator on the development of controls and processes that are necessary at the aerodrome in order to comply with the aviation security provisions of the Act and the regulatory requirements that apply to the operator;

(b) helps coordinate the implementation of the controls and processes that are necessary at the aerodrome in order to comply with the aviation security provisions of the Act and the regulatory requirements that apply to the operator; and

(c) promotes the sharing of information respecting the airport security program.

Terms of reference:

(2) The operator of the aerodrome must manage the security committee or other working group or forum in accordance with written terms of reference that

(a) identify its membership; and

(b) define the roles and responsibilities of each member.

Records:

(3) The operator of the aerodrome must keep records of the activities and decisions of the security committee or other working group or forum.

NOTE: This is not a new requirement for aerodrome operators - there was an existing requirement for aerodrome operators to have a security committee in Part 4, section 69 of the previous *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations* (SOR/2000-111).

6.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

The regulations set out the requirements for an aerodrome operator to establish and use a security committee or other working group or forum to:

- Advise on the development of aviation security controls and processes at the aerodrome;
- Coordinate the implementation of aviation security controls and processes; and
- Promote the sharing of information concerning the airport security program at the aerodrome.

Aerodrome operators must:

- Develop written terms of reference for its security committee(s);
- Detail the membership of the security committee(s);
- Describe the roles and responsibilities of each member;
- Ensure that members understand and carry out these roles and responsibilities;
- Keep records of the security committee meetings (e.g., decision records, etc.);
- Keep these records for at least two years; and
- Make these records available to the Minister given reasonable notice.

6.2 SECURITY COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE

Aerodrome operators developing a terms of reference document for their security committee may wish to include the:

- Objective/purpose;
- Membership;
- Roles and responsibilities for members and its executive (e.g., chair, vice-chair, secretary, etc.);
- Frequency of meetings;
- Use of meeting minutes or decision records;
- Procedures for the retention and dissemination of meeting minutes, decision records or other committee material;
- Sensitivity and classification of the information shared or issues being discussed by the security committee; and
- The potential need for security committee members to obtain security clearances.

Sample - Terms of Reference

Background

In compliance with the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* and International Civil Aviation Organization requirements, aerodromes must establish an aerodrome security committee.

Mandate

The role of the security committee is to focus on security issues related to aerodrome operations. This includes:

- Implementing security measures and mechanisms to maintain or enhance aviation security;
- Coordinating security procedures across multiple organizations;
- Sharing security-related information;
- Advising the aerodrome operator of the development of controls and processes required at the aerodrome to comply with the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act* and regulatory requirements that apply to the aerodrome operator;
- Coordinating implementation of the controls and processes necessary to comply with regulatory requirements;* and
- Promoting the sharing of information with regard to the airport security program (including security awareness).*

* Denotes minimum regulated requirements

Responsibilities

As a whole, the members of the security committee are responsible for:

- Advising the aerodrome operator on the development of controls and processes required at the aerodrome in order to comply with the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act* and regulatory requirements that apply to the operator;*
- Coordinating implementation of the controls and processes necessary to comply with the regulatory requirements;*
- Promoting the sharing of information with regard to the airport security program (including security awareness);*
- Reviewing relevant aviation security policy, program and regulatory proposals of interest to aerodrome operations, as well as generating recommendations and advice to Transport Canada in relation to these proposals;
- Reviewing and providing input on plans for new or modified facilities as well as new or modified operational processes;
- Reviewing the results of quality control processes and external audits; and
- Reviewing the continued adequacy and effectiveness of the airport security program.

* Denotes minimum regulated requirements

Chair/Co-Chair

The aerodrome operator will designate an aerodrome representative responsible for aerodrome security as Chair, with the security official(s) or equivalent representative who coordinates and oversees security controls and procedures at the aerodrome assuming the responsibilities of Co-Chair.

Continued On Next Page →

Sample - Terms of Reference (continued)

Chair: _____

Responsibilities: _____

Co-Chair: _____

Responsibilities: _____

Members: _____

Given the mandate of the security committee, representatives should reflect the broad and varied interests in aviation security at the airport. This should include a representative from:

- Police of jurisdiction
- Air carriers at the aerodrome
- Primary security line partners
- Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
- Aerodrome tenants
- Transport Canada
- Emergency response providers

Responsibilities: _____

Others may be invited at the discretion of the Committee Chair or as agreed upon by Committee members. To preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information, membership will be restricted to persons who have a demonstrable interest related to implementing security legislation, regulations, orders, measures, and programs. Members will be expected to safeguard all related information and documents against inappropriate disclosure.

Secretariat: _____

The aerodrome operator has assigned a representative to be responsible for recording discussions and decisions made by the security committee.

Security committee members will review and approve the record of discussions/decisions.

Records of the security committee's meetings will be kept for a period of at least two years.

Ad hoc Committees:

As deemed appropriate by its members, the security committee may create ad hoc or other subcommittees to address specific issues. The security committee must:

- Agree on the mandate, objectives and membership of any ad hoc committees; and
- Assign a representative to record ad hoc committee(s) discussions/decisions.

The ad hoc committee members will review and approve the record of its discussions/decisions.

Records of discussions and decisions by ad hoc or other subcommittees will be kept for a period of at least two years.

Meetings

The security committee will meet on the first Wednesday of every month, unless otherwise deemed necessary by the Chair. This may include special meetings of the security committee to address specific emerging issues.

Approval of Terms of Reference

As new members join the membership of the security committee changes, the terms of reference should be reviewed and concurrence sought from the new member(s).

* Insert and maintain a list of security committee members

7. MULTI-AGENCY ADVISORY COMMITTEE*

* See Supplementary Guidance Material

8. AIRPORT SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENTS*

* See Supplementary Guidance Material

9. STRATEGIC AIRPORT SECURITY PLANS*

* See Supplementary Guidance Material

10. MENUS OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS*

**Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes*

10.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

A menu of additional safeguards is a list of supplementary security activities, actions, and procedures within an aerodrome operator's control that it can employ in a heightened risk situation. Establishing menus of additional safeguards ensures that aerodrome operators are better prepared to quickly and effectively respond to a change in risk condition, adding security value to the aerodrome.

In accordance with the requirements, aerodrome operators will need to ensure that the additional safeguards set out in their menus are implementable, repeatable, graduated, and rapidly selectable by activity type or location. All classes of aerodromes are required by regulation to prepare a menu of additional safeguards in advance of the coming into force of AVSEC levels, so that if Transport Canada were to raise the level in response to a heightened risk condition, aerodrome operators could quickly select and implement the most appropriate additional safeguards to address the situation.

Aerodrome operators are likely familiar with the range of safeguards available to them at their respective aerodromes; however, those

safeguards may not have previously been recorded or documented. Similarly, they may not have previously been shared with the broader aerodrome community, including Transport Canada. By documenting and sharing menus of additional safeguards, aerodrome operators generate a wider range of options and further develop safeguards for future use.

In accordance with the requirements and to help aerodrome operators plan for a variety of situations and the resulting security needs, the menu of additional safeguards will need to cover the following activities: access controls, monitoring and patrolling, communications, and other operational controls. The menu of additional safeguards must also encompass different areas of the aerodrome including public areas, restricted areas, and non-public non-restricted areas and identify the person responsible for the implementation of each safeguard. An aerodrome operator's menu will need to be reflective of the local operating environment. Sample templates of menus of additional safeguards are included in Appendix 10.1.

A change in the level of risk will be signaled by Transport Canada through a raised AVSEC level. Changing the AVSEC level will serve two main functions – communicating a change in the level of risk and creating a regulated expectation that aerodrome operators take the necessary action(s) to address the heightened risk for a specified duration. AVSEC levels represent a shift away from prescriptive regulations towards performance- and management-based regulations. This approach to regulating trusts that industry is in the best position to assess its vulnerabilities and to identify the safeguards it is capable of implementing on a short-term basis. For further information on AVSEC levels, see Section 2.

Unfortunately, even with the best intelligence information, the precise timing and nature of emerging aviation security threats cannot always be predicted. In the past, aviation security measures and regulations were made largely in reaction to security incidents after they had taken place, leaving aerodrome operators to respond to emerging threats as they occur, without the benefit

of advance preparation. Menus of additional safeguards will better prepare aerodrome operators to rapidly and efficiently respond to heightened risk conditions.

As aviation security threats are ever-evolving, an aerodrome operator could determine that the best response to manage a specific heightened security risk has not been included in its menu because it had not been previously considered. Knowing its own operation and using available intelligence, an aerodrome operator could then choose the most appropriate safeguards for the situation, even if it is not included on its approved menu.

NOTE on Security Sensitivity: Aerodrome operators should identify and/or classify the menu of additional safeguards as security sensitive, given its nature and content. Transport Canada will be treating the menu of additional safeguards individually as “Confidential” and collectively as “Secret” under the Government of Canada’s security policy.

10.2 REQUIREMENTS BY CLASS OF AERODROME

While the regulatory requirements for the menu of additional safeguards is generally the same for all classes of aerodromes, there will be variances between Class 1, 2 and 3 aerodromes in terms of the scale of their menus, as well as the number of resources available to them. Some aerodrome operations are more complex than others and have more assets (i.e. physical and people), areas, and infrastructure that require protection. As a result, their corresponding menus of additional safeguards will result in a wider range of options and gradation than others.

10.2.1 CLASS 1 AERODROMES

Class 1 aerodrome operators are required to develop a menu of additional safeguards as part of their strategic airport security plan. While the approval process is the same for both documents, menus of additional safeguards will be reviewed and approved by Transport Canada separately from the strategic airport security plan.

In building its menu of additional safeguards, a Class 1 aerodrome operator must solicit and

consider advice from its multi-agency advisory committee, of which Transport Canada is a member.

10.2.2 CLASS 2 AND 3 AERODROMES

Class 2 and 3 aerodrome operators are not required to develop a strategic airport security plan; however, they are still required to develop a menu of additional safeguards. It is anticipated that menus for Class 2 and 3 aerodromes will be scaled-down versions of the menus prepared by Class 1 aerodrome operators. Similarly, menus of additional safeguards developed by Class 3 aerodromes may encompass fewer options and gradation than those of Class 2 aerodromes.

Although not required by regulation, a Class 2 or 3 aerodrome operator may want to solicit and consider advice from its security committee when building its menu of additional safeguards.

As with Class 1 aerodrome operators, menus of additional safeguards developed by Class 2 and 3 aerodrome operators must be reviewed and approved by Transport Canada.

10.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MENUS OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 202 (1) (c), (2), (3), and (4)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 365 (1), (2), (3), and (4)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 472 (1), (2), (3), and (4)

Strategic airport security plans:¹

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must establish a strategic airport security plan that (c) sets out a menu of additional safeguards that are

- (i) intended to mitigate heightened risk conditions in a graduated manner, and*
- (ii) consistent with the operator’s legal powers and obligations.*

Requirement to establish:²

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must establish a menu of additional safeguards that are

¹ Class 1 aerodromes only.

² Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes only.

(a) intended to mitigate heightened risk conditions in a graduated manner; and
(b) consistent with the operator's legal powers and obligations.

Menu requirements:

(2) The menu of additional safeguards must
(a) describe, by activity type and location, the safeguards in place at the aerodrome in respect of AVSEC level 1 operating conditions;
(b) allow the rapid selection of additional safeguards by activity type or location; and
(c) indicate the persons and organizations responsible for implementing each additional safeguard.

Activity types:

(3) For the purposes of paragraphs (2)(a) and (b), the activity types must include
(a) access controls;
(b) monitoring and patrolling;
(c) communications; and
(d) other operational controls.

Locations:

(4) For the purposes of paragraphs (2)(a) and (b), the locations must include
(a) public areas of the aerodrome;
(b) areas of the aerodrome that are not public areas but are not restricted areas; and
(c) restricted areas.

To create a menu of additional safeguards, an aerodrome operator will need to consider the safeguards (i.e. the activities, actions, and/or procedures) currently available to them. These safeguards will then be compiled in a menu that respects the regulated requirements.

The regulations require that menus of additional safeguards:

- Include additional safeguards intended to mitigate a heightened risk condition;
- Be graduated, so the safeguards can address an escalating risk condition;
- Be consistent with the aerodrome operator's legal powers and obligations;
- Allow for rapid selection;
- Address the following activity types: access controls, monitoring and patrolling,

communications, and other operational controls;

- Address the following locations of the aerodrome: public areas, non-public, non-restricted areas, and restricted areas;
- Describe, by activity type or location, the safeguards already in place at the aerodrome for Level 1 operating conditions; and
- Identify the persons and organizations responsible for the implementation of each safeguard.

To assist aerodrome operators in developing their menus of additional safeguards, Transport Canada is currently developing a sample template that would assist aerodrome operators with populating their safeguards in a pre-formatted electronic document (e.g. Microsoft Excel, etc.). Aerodrome operators are not required to use the template – it is being offered only as an example that satisfies the regulatory requirements. This template, along with further instructions on how to use it, will be found in Appendix 10.1.

Regional aviation security inspectors are available to provide guidance to aerodrome operators throughout the development of the menus of additional safeguards.

10.3.1 MITIGATING HEIGHTENED RISK CONDITIONS

Menus of additional safeguards must include safeguards intended to mitigate a heightened risk condition. For example, if the Minister raises the AVSEC level in response to a heightened security risk at the staff controlled gates (located in the restricted area of the aerodrome), the aerodrome operator could (but would not be limited to) select a combination of the following in order to effectively address the specific risk:

- Update post order(s);
- Increase frequency of reports;
- Increase frequency of briefings;
- Increase inspection of gates;
- Enhance supervision of access control personnel;
- Increase frequency of "after hours" check-ins from aerodrome security guards to NAV CANADA;
- Implement a back-up mode of communication; and/or
- Restrict personnel radio communications.

10.3.2 GRADUATED MENUS

Safeguards included in an aerodrome operator's menu must be graduated. The safeguards listed need to be capable of addressing an escalating risk condition. For example, if the Minister raises the AVSEC level in response to a heightened risk in the public concourse of the aerodrome terminal, the aerodrome operator could (but would not be limited to) select from any of the following graduated safeguards (i.e., range of scalable options, such as those with different frequencies) in order to address the specific risk:

- Begin or increase the frequency of unattended baggage public announcements (e.g., every 30, 20, 15, 10 or 5 minutes, etc.);
- Increase observation;
- Increase vigilance and reporting of unusual or suspicious activities or behavior;
- Increase monitoring of closed circuit television, including check-in counters (e.g., every 30, 20, 15, 10, or 5 minutes, etc.);
- Implement pre-prepared enhanced checklists for terminal inspections;
- Alter the queue management process;
- Implement an unattended baggage program;
- Increase K9 presence in terminals (belonging to either the aerodrome or police of jurisdiction) (e.g., by one, two, three, etc. dogs);
- Reduce the number of publicly accessible entrances into the terminal buildings;
- Implement a validation process at entrance(s) to terminal building; and/or
- Prohibit public access to the terminal building.

10.3.3 ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE AERODROME'S LEGAL POWERS AND OBLIGATIONS (WITHIN THE AERODROME OPERATOR'S CONTROL)

Menus of additional safeguards are required to include only those safeguards that are within the aerodrome's legal powers and obligations (i.e. within the aerodrome operator's control). In other words, menus should include safeguards that are practical and can actually be achieved by the aerodrome operator. Menus should not include safeguards under the control of a third-party that is not employed or contracted by the aerodrome. For example, as the aerodrome operator has no responsibility in terms of screening, none of the additional safeguards submitted for approval

in an aerodrome operator's menu of additional safeguards or during a heightened risk condition should involve screening. Furthermore, an aerodrome operator has no legal authority for the search of persons. The aerodrome operator is, among other things, responsible for access control and there are a number of additional safeguards available to augment access control above what is currently in place.

Similarly, a menu of additional safeguards should not include safeguards that the aerodrome operator would only be able to put into place in the future. The menu needs to be reflective of the aerodrome operator's current capabilities and operating environment.

10.3.4 RAPID SELECTION

Menus of additional safeguards are intended to assist the aerodrome operator with rapid selection, allowing the additional safeguards to be put into place quickly in response to a heightened security risk. Recognizing that some safeguards can be implemented more quickly than others, menus should encompass safeguards that the aerodrome operator can apply on an interim basis until a preferred solution can be employed.

While the regulations require a menu of additional safeguards in which each safeguard should be rapidly selectable according to its activity type or location, certain safeguards could apply to multiple locations, just as certain locations may have multiple safeguards that protect it. One way to satisfy the requirement for rapid selection is for these one-to-many relationships between safeguards, activity types and locations to be broken down into simplified safeguards with single activity type and location relationships. In other words, for ease of use, each safeguard could be associated to a maximum of one activity type, and one location (or sub-location).

For example, if safeguard "A" applies to locations "1, 2, and 3," it is best if it is captured as three separate safeguards in the menu of additional safeguards. In other words, safeguard "A1" applies to location "1," safeguard "A2" applies to location "2," and safeguard "A3" applies to location "3."

As previously noted, Transport Canada is developing a sample template of a menu of safeguards that can be found in Appendix 10.1.

10.3.5 ACTIVITY TYPES

Menus of additional safeguards must address the following activity types:

- **Access controls** (e.g., review curbside delivery and approval processes; establish check-in point(s) into the aerodrome; close or suspend construction activities; secure primary security line access points; issue visitor passes; etc.);
- **Monitoring and patrolling** (e.g., increase monitoring of parking garage; enforce parking restrictions on roadway shoulders; monitor closed-circuit television coverage; add guard(s) to loading dock; etc.);
- **Communications** (e.g., increase public announcements; use two-way radio, intercom or cell phone(s) to increase frequency of reports; install road signs; etc.); and
- **Other operational controls** (e.g., record license plates; install portable lighting; use clear garbage bags; review documents of entitlement; etc.).

Class 1 and larger Class 2 aerodromes may wish to break down activity types into sub-activity types. Recognizing that larger aerodromes presumably have a wider array of safeguards available to them, this would assist them in rapidly selecting the most appropriate safeguards in light of an elevated risk condition, and in targeting their implementation more precisely, thus minimizing the financial and operational impact as only the most applicable safeguards are implemented. For example, these aerodrome operators could (but would not be limited to) use the following sample sub-activity types:

- **Access controls:** physical access controls, procedural changes, etc.
- **Monitoring and patrolling:** monitoring, patrolling, etc.
- **Communications:** internal communications, public announcements, signage, etc.
- **Other operational controls:** facility security measures, additional security procedures, etc.

10.3.6 LOCATIONS

Menus of additional safeguards are required to address the following locations of the aerodrome:

- **Public areas** of the aerodrome (e.g., baggage storage, terminal curb, public roads, terminal

public concourse, lost and found, construction areas, etc.);

- **Non-public non-restricted areas** of the aerodrome (e.g., maintenance hangars, catering facilities, administrative offices, etc.); and
- **Restricted areas** of the aerodrome (e.g., perimeter/primary security line, primary security line fence, staff controlled gates, non-staffed gates, logistics/supply chain security, etc.).

Similar to activity types, if a Class 1 or larger Class 2 aerodrome operator decides to further break down activity types into sub-activity types, then it could (but would not be limited to) use the following sample sub-locations:

- **Public areas:** roads and parking, terminal interior, terminal exterior, etc.;
- **Non-public non-restricted areas:** operations areas, administrative areas, etc.; and
- **Restricted areas:** primary security line, terminal sterile area, baggage handling areas, airside, etc.

10.3.7 DESCRIBE SAFEGUARDS ALREADY IN PLACE (AVSEC LEVEL 1) BY ACTIVITY TYPE AND LOCATION

Menus of additional safeguards must include all safeguards already in place at the aerodrome for AVSEC level 1 (i.e. normal operating conditions). It is understood that certain aerodromes have a higher security posture and as a normal course of business have greater security safeguards currently in place. In other words, some aerodromes will operate above the regulated baseline as part of their normal operating practices. In knowing an aerodrome's current security posture (beyond the regulated requirements), both the aerodrome operator and Transport Canada can better determine the additional safeguards that could be implemented in order to best address a heightened risk situation.

10.3.8 PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE

Menus of additional safeguards must identify the persons and organizations responsible for the implementation of each additional safeguard. This helps to ensure that safeguards can be put in place quickly, as the persons and organizations responsible for the implementation of the safeguards will already be fully aware of their duties in the event of a change in AVSEC level.

10.4 REQUIREMENT TO CONSULT THE MULTI-AGENCY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes -

Part 4, Division 9, s. 203 (a) and (b)

Requirement to consult:

The operator of an aerodrome must consult its multi-agency advisory committee when the operator

(a) establishes its strategic airport security plan

(b) amends its strategic airport security plan under subsection 205.2 (1).

Class 2 Aerodromes -

Part 5, Division 9, s. 366.2 (2)

Requirement to consult:

(2) If applicable, the operator of the aerodrome must consult its multi-agency advisory committee when amending its menu of additional safeguards.

The amount of information available to an aerodrome operator as it develops its menu of additional safeguards, is increased via its communication with (and the resultant sharing of relevant aviation security information) its multi-agency advisory committee members. Class 1 aerodrome operators may choose to involve multi-agency advisory committee members from the onset in the development of their respective strategic airport security plans/menus of additional safeguards. Conversely, others may choose to consult its multi-agency advisory committee only after a draft menu has been developed. While the method for involving the multi-agency advisory committee and soliciting its feedback may differ, multi-agency advisory committee members should be provided with enough information on the product being developed to provide informed feedback.

At this time, Class 2 aerodromes are not required to have a multi-agency advisory committee. If a Class 2 aerodrome was ordered by the Minister to establish a multi-agency advisory committee, then

it must consult its multi-agency advisory committee on any amendments to its menu of additional safeguards.

10.5 SUBMISSION AND APPROVAL CRITERIA

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes -

Part 4, Division 9, s. 204 and 205.1

Requirement to submit:

204. The operator of an aerodrome must submit its strategic airport security plan to the Minister for approval.

Approval of plan:

205.1 The Minister must approve a strategic airport security plan submitted by the operator of an aerodrome if

(a) the plan meets the requirements of section 202;

(b) the plan has been reviewed by an executive within the operator's organization who is responsible for security;

(c) the plan is likely to enable the operator to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to and recover from acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation;

(d) the risk management strategy is in proportion to the risks it addresses;

(e) the operator has considered the advice of its multi-agency advisory committee;

(f) the operator has not overlooked an aviation security risk that could affect the operation of the aerodrome;

(g) the additional safeguards can be implemented rapidly and consistently;

(h) the additional safeguards are consistent with existing rights and freedoms; and

(i) the plan can be implemented without compromising aviation security.

Class 2 Aerodromes -

Part 5, Division 9, s. 366 and 366.1

Class 3 Aerodromes -

Part 6, Division 8, s. 473 and 473.1

Requirement to submit:

366./473. The operator of an aerodrome must

submit its menu of additional safeguards to the Minister for approval.

Approval:

366.1/473.1 The Minister must approve a menu of additional safeguards submitted by the operator of an aerodrome if

- (a) the menu meets the requirements of section 365/472;*
- (b) the menu has been reviewed by an executive within the operator's organization who is responsible for security;*
- (c) the additional safeguards can be implemented rapidly and consistently;*
- (d) the additional safeguards are consistent with existing rights and freedoms; and*
- (e) the additional safeguards can be implemented without compromising aviation security.*

10.5.1 SUBMISSION

Once an aerodrome operator has completed its menu of additional safeguards, it must be submitted to the Transport Canada regional office. Given the sensitive security nature of the menu, the menu should be sent by registered mail or delivered in person.

10.5.2 THE APPROVAL PROCESS

When the menu of additional safeguards is submitted to Transport Canada, it will first be reviewed in the region through the aid of a nationally consistent Validation Assessment and Approval Tool. The assessment tool used in the regions will evaluate whether or not the aerodrome operator has met the intent of the regulations and will conclude with a report with recommendations to approve or not approve the menu of additional safeguards. This recommendation will be considered along with the menu of additional safeguards by the National Approval Committee to determine formal approval. Transport Canada commits to a service standard of 90 calendar days from the submission of the completed menu of additional safeguards to Transport Canada to a decision regarding approval. A chart showing Transport Canada's approval process can be found in Annex B.

10.5.3 APPROVAL CRITERIA

The menu of additional safeguards will be approved if it satisfies the following criteria:

- The additional safeguards are intended to mitigate heightened risk conditions in a graduated manner;
- The additional safeguards are consistent with the aerodrome operator's legal powers and obligations (i.e. within the aerodrome operator's control);
- The additional safeguards are consistent with an aerodrome's class, size, location, and complexity/ type of operations in terms of content and range of options;
- The menu of additional safeguards allows for the rapid selection of additional safeguards by activity type or location;
- The menu of additional safeguards includes:
 - *Activity types (i.e. access controls; monitoring and patrolling; communications; and other operational controls; and*
 - *Locations of the aerodrome (i.e. public areas of the aerodrome; non-public, non-restricted areas; and restricted areas);*
- The menu of additional safeguards describes the safeguards already in place at the aerodrome for AVSEC Level 1 by activity type and location;
- The menu indicates the persons and organizations responsible for implementing each additional safeguard;
- The advice of the aerodrome operator's multi-agency advisory committee was considered (applicable to Class 1 aerodromes only);
- The additional safeguards can be implemented rapidly and consistently;
- The additional safeguards are consistent with existing rights and freedoms. The Minister will not approve a menu of additional safeguards that contains safeguards that may be deemed to impinge on civil rights and freedoms; and
- The additional safeguards can be implemented without compromising aviation security.

10.6 AMENDMENTS TO THE MENU OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes -

Part 4, Division 9, s. 205.2 (1) to (4) (c)

Amendments:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome may amend its menu of additional safeguards at any time, but must do so if

- (a) the plan does not reflect the operator's most recent airport security risk assessment;
- (b) the Minister informs the operator that there is a change in the threat environment that could result in a new or unaddressed medium to high risk;
- (c) the Minister informs the operator that there is a change in the threat environment that requires the addition or deletion of additional safeguards;
- (d) the Minister informs the operator that its risk-management strategy is not in proportion to a medium to high risk set out in the operator's airport security risk assessment;
- (e) the operator identifies a deficiency in the plan; or
- (f) a change is made in the aviation security provisions of the Act or in regulatory requirements and the change affects the additional safeguards.

Documentation:

(2) If the operator of the aerodrome amends its strategic airport security plan, the operator must document

- (a) the reason for the amendment; and
- (b) the factors that were taken into consideration in making that amendment.

Submission of amendment:

(3) If the operator of the aerodrome amends its strategic airport security plan, the operator must, as soon as possible, submit the amendment to the Minister for approval.

Approval:

(4) The Minister must approve an amendment if (c) in the case of an amendment to the menu of additional safeguards, required under paragraph 202 (1)(c), the conditions set out in paragraphs 205.1 (a), (b) and (f) to (i) continue to be met.

Class 2 Aerodromes -

Part 5, Division 9, s. 366.2 (1) to (4)

Class 3 Aerodromes -

Part 6, Division 8, s. 374.2 (1) to (3)

Amendments:

366.2 (1)/473.2 (1) The operator of an aerodrome may amend its menu of additional safeguards at any time, but must do so if

- (a) the Minister informs the operator that there is a change in the threat environment that requires the addition or deletion of additional safeguards;
- (b) the operator identifies a deficiency in the menu; or
- (c) a change is made in the aviation security provisions of the Act or in regulatory requirements and the change affects the additional safeguards.

Requirement to consult:³

366.2 (2) If applicable, the operator of the aerodrome must consult its multi-agency advisory committee when amending its menu of additional safeguards.

Submission of amendment:

366.2 (3)/473.2 (2) If the operator of the aerodrome amends its menu of additional safeguards, the operator must, as soon as possible, submit the amendment to the Minister for approval.

Approval:

366.2 (4)/473.2 (3) The Minister must approve the amendment if the conditions set out in section 366.1/473.1 continue to be met.

³ Class 2 aerodromes only.

The aerodrome operator is required to amend its menu of additional safeguards if:

- The Minister informs the aerodrome operator that there is a change in the threat environment that requires the addition or deletion of additional safeguards (e.g., a new type of weapon or credible method of attack has been identified, etc.);
- The aerodrome operator identifies a deficiency in its menu of additional safeguards (through a security exercise or by any other means); and/or
- A change is made in the aviation security provisions of the *Aeronautics Act* or in regulatory requirements and the change affects the additional safeguards (e.g., actions previously included in the additional safeguards are now part of the baseline requirements, etc.).

When amendments are required, the updated menu of additional safeguards must be submitted, as soon as reasonably possible, to the Transport Canada regional office. Given the sensitive security nature of the menu, the menu should be sent by registered mail or delivered in person.

10.7 EXERCISING THE MENU OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Aerodrome operators are required to test the effectiveness of their menus of additional safeguards through security exercises. During security exercises, participants are required to resolve scenarios by acting out the responses they would have taken had there been an actual emergency. By testing response capabilities, aerodrome operators could identify deficiencies in their operations.

If, as a result of the exercise, an aerodrome operator finds gaps or other deficiencies in its menu of additional safeguards, it will be required to amend the menu to address the issue(s). By amending the menu, the operator will be better prepared to address situations of heightened security risk and to do so more rapidly.

Under the current regulations, aerodrome operators are required to carry-out two types of security exercises: operations-based and discussion-based. For more information regarding requirements for security exercises, please see Section 12.

10.8 RECORDS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes -

Part 4, Division 9, s. 210 (1)

Class 2 Aerodromes -

Part 5, Division 9, s. 371 (1)

Class 3 Aerodromes -

Part 6, Division 8, s. 478 (1)

Records:

(1) Each time additional safeguards are implemented at an aerodrome in order to mitigate heightened risk conditions related to aviation security, the operator of the aerodrome must create a record that includes

- (a) a description of the additional safeguards that were implemented;*
- (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness of those additional safeguards; and*
- (c) a description of any actions that are planned in order to address deficiencies identified during the implementation of those additional safeguards.*

Each time additional safeguards are employed at an aerodrome in response to a heightened risk condition (in the context of a security exercise or during a real-world response), the aerodrome operator is required to create a written record. The record must include:

- A description of the additional safeguards that were implemented;
- An evaluation of the effectiveness of those additional safeguards; and
- A description of any actions planned in order to address any deficiencies identified during the implementation of those additional safeguards.

The aerodrome operator will be required to submit the report to the Minister upon his or her request.

Aerodrome operators may wish to consider the following key areas in preparing their written records:

- The timing/time-frame of the implementation of additional safeguards;
- An outline of the circumstances surrounding the implementation (what led to the implementation);
- A list of persons and organizations who participated in the implementation;

- A systematic account of each aspect of the implementation of safeguards from start to end;
- An evaluation of the effectiveness of the additional safeguards employed (e.g., risk mitigation value, deficiencies, operational impact, etc.);
- Recommendations for corrective action (e.g., revise standard operating procedures and/or emergency plan, update employee/emergency responder training, etc.); and
- Follow-up and/or monitoring, if required.

APPENDIX 10.1: SAMPLE MENU OF ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS TEMPLATE

A sample template is currently under development for large aerodromes.

Smaller airports may choose to develop their menu of additional safeguards based on the sample below.

Sample Menu of Safeguards by Category and Area-Class 3

DRAFT VERSION
Current as of November 21, 2012
For Discussion Purposes Only

Access Control						
Areas	Sub-area	Normal Operating Conditions (AVSEC Level 1)	Additional Safeguards	Frequency	Security Personnel (OPI)	Comments
Public Area	Baggage Storage	Locked storage area	Close facility			
	Terminal Curb	No long term parking	Review curbside delivery and approval process			
		Plantars at entrances to terminal	Add checkpoint for access			
			Cease deliveries to terminal curb			
			Restrict parking on terminal curb			
			Install barrier at cross-overs into terminal(s)			
	Public Roads	Signage posted on public roadway shoulders warns that parking/stopping is not permitted.	Enforcement of parking ban on roadway			

11. EMERGENCY PLANS*

*Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes

11.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 206 (1) and (2)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 367 (1) and (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 474 (1) and (2)

Plan requirements:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must establish an emergency plan that sets out the response procedures to be followed at the aerodrome for coordinated responses to the following emergencies:

- (a) bomb threats;*
- (b) hijackings of aircraft; and*
- (c) other acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.*

Response procedures:

- (2) The response procedures must*
 - (a) set out in detail the actions to be taken by the employees and contractors of the operator of the aerodrome and identify the responsibilities of all other persons or organizations involved, including, as applicable, the police, emergency response providers, air carriers, emergency coordination centre personnel and control tower or flight service station personnel;*
 - (b) include detailed procedures for the evacuation of air terminal buildings;*
 - (c) include detailed procedures for the search of air terminal buildings;*
 - (d) include detailed procedures for the handling and disposal of a suspected bomb; and*
 - (e) include detailed procedures for the detention on the ground of any aircraft involved in a bomb threat or hijacking.*

Please note, that while these regulations were a part of the Phase 1 airport security program, they have been updated and enhanced to include acts of unlawful interference to align with international standards.

An emergency plan must be established for the purpose of responding to threats such as bomb threats, hijackings, and other acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

Other acts of unlawful interference were added to the list of threats as part of airport security programs, Phase 2 and include but are not limited to:

- Unlawful seizure of an aircraft;
- Forced intrusion, or infiltration of the restricted area of an aerodrome or an aircraft;
- Hostile take-over at an aerodrome;
- Hostage taking in the air or on the ground;
- Introduction on board an aircraft or at an aerodrome of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes;
- Communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public;
- Interference with critical infrastructure such as navigation aids, etc.; and
- Risks identified in the aerodrome operator's airport security risk assessment.

As International Civil Aviation Organization guidance evolves, the above list may change. The current definition for "acts of unlawful interference" can be found in Section 1.3 of this guidance.

Under the *Canadian Aviation Regulations*, aerodrome operators are required to have an emergency response plan for safety purposes. It should be noted that, in order to satisfy the security requirements of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*, aerodrome operators are not expected to have a separate or additional emergency plan; one emergency response plan, which incorporates both safety and security elements, is sufficient.

In the context of an emergency plan, "response" refers to the processes and/or activities used to react to a threat from the point of notification to conclusion. "Procedures" are the steps or

actions that are to be taken to respond to an emergency situation related to security. In the event of an emergency, aerodrome employees and contractors should be able to look at the plan, see the procedures, and know how they should respond to a particular emergency. A response plan should also be integrated and coordinated with partners such as: police of jurisdiction; NAV CANADA; security guards or commissionaires; air carriers; Transport Canada or other government departments; the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority; and primary security line partners that assist in responding to or minimizing the impact of a threat. The aerodrome operator's emergency plan should provide sufficient information on the responsibilities of these other organizations so that the response to an emergency can be comprehensive and coordinated.

11.2 CONSIDERATIONS

When developing the emergency plan, an aerodrome operator should consider:

1. The procedures to be followed when information is received by aerodrome employees, with or without aviation security related roles and responsibilities.
 - This should include standard operating procedures for employees and contractors to follow when there is a bomb threat, threat of a hijacking, or other acts of unlawful interference. The number to be called in the event of an emergency (e.g. an aerodrome emergency number, security guard station, 911, etc.) should be posted throughout the aerodrome in the security operation control centre or the airport operation control centre, and included in the security awareness program.
2. The procedures to be followed by aerodrome personnel who are not employed by the aerodrome operator, such as the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, air carrier personnel, or other persons employed at the aerodrome and who receive information about a bomb threat, threat of a hijacking, or other acts of unlawful interference.
 - It is important to ensure that these procedures are developed in coordination with the various non-aerodrome personnel (such as municipal police, fire, and ambulance personnel who are not working at the aerodrome) to ensure that they understand the procedures and are able to implement them.
3. The pre-determined response procedures or protocols for aerodrome security personnel and first responders that have aerodrome-related security role and responsibilities.
 - Specific procedures should include the evacuation of the air terminal building, the search of the air terminal building, and procedures to be followed to detain an aircraft that is the subject of a bomb threat, hijacking, or other acts of unlawful interference. The procedures or protocols should include clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as well as address on-scene command. Again, some or all of these response personnel may not be employed by the aerodrome operator, and the procedures would therefore need to be developed in coordination with these first responders to ensure they agree with them, are capable of being implemented, and will be followed in the event of an emergency.
4. The pre-determined rapid emergency notification (fan-out) process for a threat, including notifying Transport Canada immediately and involving other aerodrome occupants or primary security line partners, as required.
5. Ensuring that contact information for all organizations and/or individuals responsible for response activities at the aerodrome (see numbers three and four, above) is up-to-date, and having a process to check it routinely.
 - Contact information for backup personnel is also important in case a key organization or individual is unavailable or unable to respond.
6. The establishment of an emergency coordination centre where an emergency response team can assemble to respond to the threat.
 - Where relevant, procedures should be developed for the efficient and prompt activation of the emergency response team. Procedures should include the security operation centre's response and how they are to inform senior aerodrome officials.

The emergency coordination centre should be located in an area of the aerodrome accessible to emergency responders but separate from the remaining aerodrome personnel.

7. For Class 1 and 2 aerodrome operators, an emergency coordination centre is required, and should be equipped with the necessary tools required to act as a coordination centre for threat response (e.g. telephones, desks, computer, television, countdown and time zone clocks, secure telephone and facsimile, etc.).
8. The emergency response team should include representation from the police, Transport Canada, affected air carrier(s), the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, other partners, and tenants as required.
 - The aerodrome should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each member, as well as identify a chain of command within the emergency response team.
9. Procedures or protocols to assist the emergency response team members to make risk-based decisions throughout the course of the emergency (e.g. tools to conduct an assessment of the risks related to the emergency, summarize decisions made, and monitor responses to actions taken, etc.).

An aerodrome operator should regularly update its emergency plan, tools, contact lists and relevant procedures. In addition, the emergency plan should be frequently reviewed following exercises or actual emergency situations. All organizations and individuals who contribute to emergency response and who are included in the plan should have copies of the most recent plan. Regular security exercises (see Section 12) will also help to ensure that the plan is maintained, effective, and that the organizations and individuals involved understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency.

It will be important to provide training on the emergency plan to those aerodrome employee and contractor groups whose aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities include responding to emergencies and activating

the emergency plan (or parts of it). For more information on training, see Section 4.

11.3 REQUIREMENT FOR RECORDS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 210 (2)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 371 (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 478 (2)

Emergencies:

(2) Each time an emergency referred to in subsection 206 (1) [367 (1), 474 (1)] occurs at an aerodrome, the operator of the aerodrome must create a record that includes

- (a) a description of the emergency;*
- (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the operator's emergency plan; and*
- (c) a description of any actions that are planned in order to address deficiencies identified during the emergency.*

The written record for an emergency should include items such as:

- An outline of the circumstances surrounding the emergency;
- An outline of the response taken, including the procedures followed;
- A list of persons, organizations, agencies, and/or other stakeholders who participated in the response;
- A systematic account of the emergency from start to finish;
- An evaluation of the response to the emergency;
- Recommendations for corrective actions; and
- Follow-up and/or monitoring, if required.

Please note that procedures for police of jurisdiction and evaluation regarding their response do not have to be included in the record **unless** the police of jurisdiction have a specific aerodrome-related aviation security role or responsibility related to the emergency referred to in 206. (1), 367. (1) and 474. (1).

12. SECURITY EXERCISES*

*Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes

12.1 GENERAL INFORMATION


Security exercise requirements are not new, although the old provisions were updated to align with national and international standards and naming conventions. The regulatory provisions related to security exercises were previously found in the *Aerodrome Security Measures*.

Security exercises are used to train and to practice prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response in a safe environment. Properly trained personnel who have regularly exercised their roles are more prepared to respond to an aviation security emergency (i.e. bomb threat, hijacking, or other acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation). Exercises can also be an invaluable tool to help assess and improve the performance of aerodrome safety and security personnel, as well as emergency responders. Well-designed and executed exercises are an effective means of:

- Testing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and interagency arrangements;
- Clarifying security roles and responsibilities and training the appropriate personnel;
- Improving interagency coordination and communications;
- Identifying gaps in resources;
- Practicing response to emergencies and improving the performance of responders and decision-makers; and
- Identifying opportunities for improvement.

The persons involved in the exercise should be reflective of the type of scenario being conducted. This may include public and private organizations from a range of disciplines. Please note, it is acceptable for aerodrome operators to hold combined safety and security exercises (e.g. hijacking that results in a crash on site, or a hostile take-over that results in a medical safety issue, etc.).

This diagram below provides an illustration of exercise types and their level of complexity.



12.2 EXERCISE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

The following guidance for exercise design and development may be applied to both operations-based and discussion-based exercises.

12.2.1 EXERCISE TOPICS

The exercise topics for both operations-based and discussion-based exercises should address:

- Bomb threats;
- Hijacking; and
- Other acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, which could include:
 - *Hostile take-over;*
 - *Hostage taking;*
 - *Interference with critical infrastructure such as navigation aids or the aerodrome's information technology infrastructure; and/or*
 - *Infiltration of restricted areas.*

These topics relate directly to the events that need to be addressed within the aerodrome's emergency plan and for which response procedures should be established. For further examples of other acts of unlawful interference, please see the definition in Section 1.3.

Both operations-based and discussion-based exercises should be designed to:

- a. Test the effectiveness of the aerodrome operator's emergency plan in response to an act of unlawful interference with civil aviation

- and involve the persons and organizations referred to in the plan; and
- b. Test the effectiveness of the additional safeguards in the menu of additional safeguards.⁹

12.2.2 EXERCISE PLANNING

In order to ensure that objectives are met, exercises (regardless of whether they are operations-based or discussion-based) require considerable time and resources to prepare. Components include, but are not limited to:

- Defining the objectives;
- Identifying participants;
- Coordinating with participants;
- Considering the expected actions;
- Considering consequences of actions;
- Developing exercise materials;
- Developing evaluation materials (ideally considered during the design and development stage);
- Notifying all participants, including Transport Canada, in advance of the exercise;
- Identifying and addressing administrative and logistical matters; and
- Staffing and training the exercise team.

12.2.3 CONDUCT AND EVALUATE EXERCISE

It is the responsibility of the aerodrome operator to ensure that security exercises are performed; however, the exercises themselves can be conducted and evaluated by an exercise facilitator and/or exercise design team. Subject matter experts and non-participatory staff could also assist.

Evaluation of an exercise should be based on the information and experiences obtained through training and past exercises. Evaluation should include:

- Confirming whether or not the exercise objectives have been achieved;
- Identifying deficiencies (e.g. training, knowledge of roles, communications, procedures, etc.);
- Identifying lessons learned and actions to address deficiencies;

- Looking at improvements in the plan(s) or element(s) being tested; and
- Monitoring and/or following up.

Using the criteria above, an outline of the activities should be developed to provide staff, stakeholders, and first response agencies with the necessary tools to build awareness and confidence in the plans, procedures, and systems utilized in security and emergency response operations. This evaluation should be used in a security exercise debrief to update the emergency plan, and to identify any training gaps that must be addressed.

12.3 DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 208 (1) and (2)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 369 (1) and (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 476 (1) and (2)

Discussion-based security exercise:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must, at least once a year, carry out a discussion-based security exercise that

(a) tests the effectiveness of the operator's emergency plan in response to an act of unlawful interference with civil aviation and involves the persons and organizations referred to in the plan; and

(b) tests the effectiveness of additional safeguards that the operator chooses from its menu of additional safeguards.

Exception:

(2) Despite subsection (1), the operator of an aerodrome is not required to carry out a discussion-based security exercise in any year in which it carries out an operations-based security exercise.

⁹ For more information on menus of additional safeguards, see Section 10 of the guidance.

12.3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Discussion-based security exercises generally involve senior staff and key personnel discussing various issues regarding a hypothetical security scenario or situation. Discussion-based exercises can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures. Discussion-based exercises can also be used to assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a security incident. Discussion-based exercises are aimed at facilitating an understanding of concepts, identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. They are a suitable means for exercising specific elements of an emergency plan and the menu of additional safeguards.

Discussion-based exercises are normally used as a starting point to improve the confidence, experience, and performance of personnel responding to emergency and security situations. Discussion-based exercises include seminars, workshops, table-top exercises and games. These types of exercises typically highlight existing plans, policies, mutual aid agreements, and procedures, and can be used to identify shortcomings. Facilitators lead discussions and keep participants focused in order to meet the objectives of the exercise. Thus, they are exceptional tools for familiarizing agencies and personnel with current or expected jurisdictional capabilities.

The following sections describe, in order of complexity, the four types of discussion-based exercises.

12.3.2 SEMINARS

Seminars are employed to orient participants, or provide an overview of authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, protocols, response resources, concepts, and ideas. Seminars provide a good starting point for aerodrome operators that are developing or making major changes to their plans and procedures. They offer the following characteristics:

- Low-stress environment employing a number of instructional techniques such as lectures,

multimedia presentations, panel discussions, case study discussions, expert testimony, and decision support tools;

- Discussions led by a seminar leader;
- Lack of time constraints caused by real-time portrayal of events; and
- Effective with both small and large groups.

12.3.3 WORKSHOPS

Workshops differ from seminars in two important ways: participant interaction is increased, and they focus on achieving or building a product (such as a plan, procedure or a policy). Workshops provide an ideal forum for:

- Collecting or sharing information;
- Obtaining new or different perspectives;
- Testing new processes or procedures;
- Training groups in coordinated activities;
- Problem-solving complex issues;
- Obtaining consensus; and
- Team-building.

To be effective, workshops should be focused on a specific issue and the desired outcome or goal should be clearly defined. Workshops share the following common points:

- Low-stress environment;
- No-fault forum;
- Information conveyed employing different instructional techniques;
- Facilitated, working breakout sessions;
- Discussions led by a workshop leader;
- Goal-oriented;
- Lack of time constraint from real-time portrayal of events; and
- Effective with both small and large groups.

12.3.4 TABLE-TOP EXERCISES

Table-top exercises involve all levels of staff, including operational and senior managers or executives, and/or other key personnel discussing hypothetical situations in an informal setting. This type of exercise is intended to stimulate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical situation. It can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, response to, and recovery from a defined event. Table-top exercises are

typically aimed at facilitating the understanding of concepts, identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Participants are encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through slow-paced problem solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision-making that occurs under actual or simulated emergency conditions.

An example of this would be the use of a table-top exercise to introduce the concepts and opening phases of a full-scale exercise. The table-top exercise would engage the higher levels of the command structure in the overall strategy of the operations-based exercise thereby allowing for an opportunity to refine the objectives prior to commitment of the physical resources in a full-scale exercise.

12.3.5 GAMES

Games are simulations of operations, often involving two or more teams using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real-life situation. Like a table-top exercise, it does not involve the use of field resources. The sequence of events affects the decisions of players who are presented with scenarios and asked to perform or discuss a task associated with the scenario episode. The goal is to explore decision-making processes and the consequences of those decisions. Games are also suitable means for exercising elements of an emergency plan.

12.3.6 FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISES

Aerodrome operators at Class 1, 2, and 3 aerodromes must hold a discussion-based exercise at least once per year.

12.3.7 EQUIVALENCY

The aerodrome operator is not required to carry out a discussion-based security exercise in any year in which it carries out an operations-based security exercise.

12.4 OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 9, s. 207 (1) and (2)

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 368 (1) and (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 475 (1) and (2)

Operations-based security exercise:

(1) The operator of an aerodrome must, at least once every two [two, four] years, carry out an operations-based security exercise that

- (a) tests the effectiveness of the operator's emergency plan in response to an act of unlawful interference with civil aviation and involves the persons and organizations referred to in the plan; and*
- (b) tests the effectiveness of additional safeguards that the operator chooses from its menu of additional safeguards.*

Equivalency:

(2) If, in response to an aviation security incident, the Minister raises the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome, the implementation of additional safeguards by the operator of the aerodrome counts as an operations-based security exercise for the purposes of subsection (1).

12.4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Operations-based security exercises (formerly known as live exercises) are typically more complex than discussion-based security exercises as they involve a practical test of the emergency plan, policies, procedures, agreements, and menu of additional safeguards. Operations-based security exercises include, from least to most complex, drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises. They can clarify roles and responsibilities, identify gaps in resources, and improve individual and team performance. Operations-based exercises are characterized by the mobilization of apparatus, resources, and personnel, usually over an extended period of time. Participants are required to resolve a scenario by acting out their responses just as in a

real life emergency (e.g. security teams apprehend and detain simulated perpetrators, simulated passengers are evacuated from the terminal, etc.) rather than simply discussing how they would respond.

The following sections describe the three types of operations-based exercises.

12.4.2 DRILLS

A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity that is employed to measure a single specific operation. Drills are commonly used to provide training on new equipment, develop or test new policies or procedures, or practice and maintain current skills.

Drills involve:

- A narrow focus, measured against established standards;
- Instant feedback;
- Realistic environment; and
- Performance in isolation.

Drills are divided into three instructional stages. Each stage evolves from the knowledge and experience gained from the previous stage. The stages are:

Orientation: Provides preliminary re-enforcement of material covered during training. Guidance and references would need to be provided to the participant throughout the drill.

Review: Meant to measure the progress of the participant by withholding guidance and evaluating the participant's ability to locate information required within provided reference material.

Demonstration: Provides the opportunity for the participant to illustrate his or her knowledge level of the objective of the drill. No reference material or guidance should be provided at this stage.

12.4.3 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISES

A functional exercise is designed to test and evaluate individual capabilities, multiple functions or activities within a function, or interdependent groups of functions. Functional exercises exercise the plans, policies, procedures, and staff of the direction and control components of Incident Command, Incident Management System and/or Unified Command. Generally, events are projected through an exercise scenario that drives activity at the management level. Movement of personnel and equipment is simulated. The objective of a functional exercise is to execute specific plans and procedures and to apply established policies, plans, and procedures under crisis conditions. A functional exercise simulates the reality of operations in a functional area by presenting complex and realistic problems that require rapid and effective responses by trained personnel in a highly stressful environment. Functional exercises would be used in areas such as:

- Evaluating functions such as interagency response; and
- Evaluating the emergency operations centers and staff.

12.4.4 FULL-SCALE EXERCISES

The full-scale exercise is the most complex type of exercise. Full-scale exercises are multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional exercises that test many facets of security, emergency response and recovery. They include first responders operating under the Incident Command System, Incident Management System, or Unified Command System, so as to exercise all those involved in responding to and recovering from an incident.

A full-scale exercise focuses on implementing and analyzing plans, policies, and procedures developed in discussion-based exercises and are based on lessons learned in previous, smaller, operations-based exercises. The events are acted out through a scripted exercise scenario with built-in flexibility to allow updates to the activity. It is conducted in a real-time, stressful environment that closely mirrors a real event. First responders and resources are mobilized and deployed to the scene

where they conduct their actions as if a real incident had occurred (with minor exceptions). The full-scale exercise simulates the reality of operations in multiple functional areas by presenting complex and realistic problems requiring critical thinking, rapid problem solving, and effective responses by trained personnel in a highly stressful environment. Other entities that are not involved in the exercise, but who would be involved in an actual event, should be instructed not to respond.

A typical full-scale exercise can:

- Assess organizational and individual performance;
- Demonstrate interagency cooperation;
- Allocate resources and personnel;
- Assess equipment capabilities;
- Activate personnel and equipment;
- Assess inter-jurisdictional cooperation;
- Exercise public information systems;
- Test communications systems and procedures; and
- Analyze memorandums of understanding, Standard Operating Procedures, plans, policies, and procedures.

The level of support needed to conduct a full-scale exercise is greater than needed during other types of exercises. This type of exercise would not normally be conducted by Transport Canada at the regional level. However, Transport Canada may be invited to attend a community-based full-scale exercise as part of the Unified Command System.

12.4.5 FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS-BASED EXERCISES

Class 1 and 2 aerodrome operators must hold an operations-based exercise at least once every two years, whereas Class 3 aerodrome operators must hold an operations-based exercise once every four years.

12.4.6 EQUIVALENCY

If, in response to an aviation security incident, the Minister raises the AVSEC level for an aerodrome or any part of an aerodrome, the implementation of additional safeguards from the aerodrome operator's menu of additional safeguards would count as an operations-based security exercise.

12.5 REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY MINISTER

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 209
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 370
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 477

Notice:

The operator of an aerodrome must give the Minister 60 days' notice of any security exercise that the operator plans to carry out.

Exercises take time to prepare and participants need advance warning of when a security exercise may take place. This advance warning will maximize coordination among multiple agencies and organizations, as well as ensure that policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, and interagency arrangements can be validated before the exercise takes place.

According to the regulatory requirements, aerodrome operators must notify the Minister of Transport of the exercise in writing (i.e. letter or email) at least 60 days in advance. This can be done through a Transport Canada Regional Office. The Regional Director or Regional Manager will accept the notice on behalf of the Minister, and where possible, indicate whether or not an aviation security inspector can participate.

12.6 REQUIREMENT FOR RECORDS

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 210 (3)
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 371 (3)
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 478 (3)

Exercises:

- (3) Each time a security exercise is carried out at an aerodrome, the operator of the aerodrome must create a record that includes*
- (a) an outline of the exercise scenario;*
 - (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the exercise; and*
 - (c) a description of any actions that are planned in order to address deficiencies identified during the exercise.*

The written record for an emergency exercise should include items such as:

- An outline of the exercise scenario;
- An outline of the exercise objectives;
- A list of persons, organizations, agencies, and/or other stakeholders who participated in the exercise;
- A systematic account of each aspect of the exercise from start to end;
- An evaluation of the exercise (each aspect and overall) and the players;
- Recommendations for corrective action (e.g. revise standard operating procedures and /or emergency plan, update employee/emergency responder training, etc.); and
- Follow-up and/or monitoring, if required.

13. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS*

*Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes

13.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 211
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 372
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 479

Corrective actions:

Subject to section [212, 373, 480], the operator of an aerodrome must immediately take corrective actions to address a vulnerability that contributes to a heightened aviation security risk at the aerodrome and that

- (a) is identified to the operator by the Minister; or*
- (b) is identified by the operator.*

Aerodrome operators need to take corrective actions immediately following the identification of any aviation security risk. An aviation security risk at an aerodrome could include:

- Access points that are not secured;
- Screening checkpoint communication failure; and/or
- A breach of the primary security line.

13.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - PHASED APPROACH INCLUDING THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Class 1 Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 9, s. 212
Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 373
Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 480

Corrective action plan:

If a corrective action to be taken by the operator of an aerodrome under section [211, 372, 479] involves a phased approach, the operator must include in its airport security program a corrective action plan that sets out

- (a) the nature of the vulnerability to be addressed;*
- (b) a rationale for the phased approach; and*
- (c) a timetable setting out when each phase of the corrective action plan will be completed.*

This provision was added because Transport Canada understands that there may be cases where the immediate interim solution to address an identified security risk is not sustainable for a prolonged period of time or is not the final solution for addressing the risk. When a phased approach is involved, the Department requires a corrective action plan to ensure that the risk is being addressed until a final solution is reached.

Sample - Process

An analysis of the risk, incident, or breach is conducted, including information input from affected aerodrome stakeholders.

1. Define the issue.
 - a. Transport Canada or another source identifies an aviation security risk;
 - b. A security incident or breach has occurred;
 - c. An unmitigated risk has been identified;
 - d. There appears to be a reoccurring issue; or
 - e. Aerodrome processes and procedures are not meeting regulatory requirements.
2. Gather data and information relevant to the issue.
3. Analyze the data and information gathered.
4. Identify and develop corrective actions to address the issue.
 - a. Identify who, what, where, when, and how for each action.
 - b. Identify timeframes for taking corrective action.
 - c. Where longer term corrective action is required, document in a corrective action plan.
 - d. Identify monitoring activities.
 - e. Validate corrective action prior to implementing (e.g., testing process, procedures, etc.).
 - f. Assess the impact of the corrective action on operations (e.g., new risks, threats, etc.).
5. Implement corrective action.

NOTE: Use these steps to take immediate corrective action to ensure that the risk does not continue.
6. Conduct follow-up once the risk has been addressed and prevented from continuing.
 - a. Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective action and document the process and results.
 - b. Determine if the issue has been resolved;
 - i. If issue is not resolved, repeat the process.
 - ii. If issue is resolved, share lessons learned and corrective actions/plans with affected aerodrome stakeholders, as required.

The immediate corrective action may resolve the risk entirely. For example, the risk was caused by a hole in the primary security line fence, which is mended immediately; however, in this case, corrective actions should include more frequent inspection of the primary security line.

A phased corrective action process begins once the aerodrome has returned to normal operations after a security breach or incident and when a more complex or comprehensive long-term corrective action is necessary. For example, the locking mechanism (manual or electronic) on an airside gate has failed and is not controlling access to the restricted area.

1. A security guard is posted immediately to deal with the risk and control access.
2. The phased corrective action plan would include ordering new parts or having maintenance repair the gate and then test to verify that it is repaired at which time the security guard will be removed.

Aerodrome operators developing and taking corrective actions may wish to:

- Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the aerodrome processes and procedures to meet the aviation security requirements and document the process and results;
- Develop a corrective action/plan that is achievable and realistic;
- Identify and document what is to be done and who is responsible for completion;
- Determine required resources and approvals;
- Establish necessary contacts in other organizations that may need to be consulted or will have a role in the implementation of the corrective actions;
- Determine the need to establish, monitor and update security performance measures; and
- Review and update plans, programs, processes and procedures to reflect new measures that address the aviation security risk.

NOTE: Regulations require aerodrome operators to take corrective actions to address an identified risk. If the identified risk is the result of non-compliance with a regulatory provision, aerodrome operators should be aware that taking corrective action does not preclude Transport Canada from taking enforcement action with respect to non-

compliance, depending on the circumstances and seriousness surrounding the identified risk.

14. ROLE OF THE AERODROME OPERATOR IN AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY SECURITY LINE PARTNERS*

*Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 aerodromes

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012

Class 1 Aerodromes –

Part 4, Division 11, s. 224 and s. 231 (1) and (2)

Division overview:

224. This Division sets out the role of a primary security line partner in supporting the establishment and implementation of an effective airport security program by the operator of an aerodrome.

Provision of information to operator of aerodrome:

231. (1) At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must provide the operator of the aerodrome with the information that is documented or created under this Division on reasonable notice given by the operator.

Provision to Minister:

231. (2) The primary security line partner must provide the Minister with the same information on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

Class 2 Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 374 (1) and (2)

Class 3 Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 481 (1) and (2)

Provision of information to operator of aerodrome:

(1) For the purpose of supporting the establishment and implementation of an airport security program by the operator of an aerodrome, a primary security line partner at the aerodrome must, on reasonable notice given by the operator, provide the operator with
(a) information respecting the measures, procedures and processes that the partner

has in place at the aerodrome to protect the security of restricted areas and to prevent breaches of the primary security line; and
(b) a document that

- (i) describes each area on the aerodrome's primary security line that is occupied by the partner,*
- (ii) indicates the location of each restricted area access point in those areas, and*
- (iii) describes those restricted area access points.*

Provision of information to Minister:

(2) The primary security line partner must provide the Minister with the information and the document on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

In addition to airport security program requirements for aerodrome operators, the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* also introduces airport security program requirements for primary security line partners making them a newly regulated entity. It is important to note that airport security program requirements for operators and partners are separated within the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*. Aerodrome operators and partners are each legally and separately responsible for implementing their respective airport security requirements.

The intent of regulating primary security line partners is to support the effective establishment of the airport's security program. The regulatory requirements for partners are not intended to intervene or replace arrangements or obligations between aerodrome operators and their tenants, lessees, or other organizations that operate on the primary security line at the airport. **Aerodrome operators and partners are encouraged to communicate and collaborate on security issues.**

The determination of who is a primary security line partner is based on the regulatory definition.¹⁰ A list of primary security line partners at Class 1 aerodromes was developed by Transport Canada in cooperation with Class 1 aerodrome operators. A list of primary security line partners is currently being developed for Class 2 and 3 aerodromes, in line with program application dates in 2013. All partners have or will receive written notification from Transport Canada.

As the regulator for both aerodrome operators and partners, Transport Canada will verify the regulatory compliance of regulated entities separately. Aviation security inspectors will meet with the aerodrome operator prior to conducting inspections of primary security line partners to discuss any issues, concerns, and/or best practices.

The partner is required by regulation to provide the aerodrome operator (on reasonable notice) with information regarding their airport security program requirements. Although there is no regulatory requirement for the aerodrome operator to keep a partner's airport security program information, if an aerodrome operator chooses to retain it as part of their airport security program, aviation security inspectors may request to review a copy of a primary security line partner's program information. This may be done in order to verify that the information they have been provided with is current and consistent with the information provided to the Minister.

At the time of inspection, aviation security inspectors will request documented program information for review. The one exception to this is in the case of the security official (i.e. both aerodrome operators and partners must notify the Minister (e.g., email or in writing, etc.) with the name and contact information of their security official(s)) (see Section 3 for more information on security officials).

¹⁰ A "primary security line partner" means a business, organization or non-profit group—other than the operator of an aerodrome, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, a government department or agency or the police service with jurisdiction at an aerodrome—that occupies an area that is on an aerodrome's primary security line and that includes a restricted area access point. This definition includes, but is not limited to, a commercial lessee of the operator of an aerodrome.

NOTE: In support of airport security program requirements and as a best practice, it is recommended that aerodrome operators advise Transport Canada when they are aware of changes to their partners' programs. Transport Canada recognizes that in some cases, partners are sub-tenants of other tenants and that the aerodrome operator will not always be aware of new or departing partners. That said, it could be considered a best practice for aerodrome operators to request that their tenants inform them of new or departing sub-tenants.

**CHAPTER 2 –
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY SECURITY LINE
PARTNERS AT CLASS 1 AERODROMES**



15. OVERVIEW

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 224*

Division Overview:

This division sets out the role of a primary security line partner in supporting the establishment and implementation of an effective airport security program by the operator of an aerodrome.

The purpose of an airport security program is to help an aerodrome manage aviation security in a way that is comprehensive, integrated, coordinated, and risk-based. It is comprised of elements such as policies, processes, procedures, and practices that are focused on security detection, prevention, response, and recovery to safeguard civil aviation against acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference. Due to the complex nature of the airport environment, the establishment and implementation of an airport security program requires the support of many players through the provision of information, the promotion of security awareness, and the development of documentation and or systems for the management of security. This includes support from primary security line partners.¹¹

The intent of regulating primary security line partners is to support the effective establishment of the aerodrome's security program. The regulatory requirements for partners are not intended to interfere or replace arrangements or obligations between aerodrome operators and their tenants, lessees or other organizations that operate on the primary security line at the airport. **Transport Canada encourages aerodrome operators and partners to communicate and collaborate on security issues and on the development of their**

¹¹ A "primary security line partner" means a business, organization or non-profit group—other than the operator of an aerodrome, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, a government department or agency or the police service with jurisdiction at an aerodrome—that occupies an area that is on an aerodrome's primary security line and that includes a restricted area access point. This definition includes, but is not limited to, a commercial lessee of the operator of an aerodrome.

airport security program requirements for the purpose of harmonization of security at the aerodrome.

This section provides explanations, guidance and examples to help primary security line partners at Class 1 aerodromes in completing airport security program requirements found in the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

Aerodrome operators and partners will be legally responsible for implementing their respective airport security program requirements and Transport Canada will verify the regulatory compliance of each separately. The partner is required by regulation to provide both the aerodrome operator and the Minister (on reasonable notice) with information regarding their airport security program.

Partners should be aware that aviation security inspectors will meet with the aerodrome operator prior to conducting inspections of primary security line partners to discuss any issues, concerns, or best practices concerning their partners.

NOTE: There is no requirement for primary security line partners to submit documentation related to airport security program requirements to Transport Canada for approval. Aviation security inspectors will conduct on-site inspection/oversight to verify compliance after the requirements come into force. Aviation security inspectors will be available for support and advice during the implementation period.

16. SECURITY OFFICIAL

16.1 AVAILABILITY OF THE SECURITY OFFICIAL(S)

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 226 (1)*

One security official at all times:

(1) A primary security line partner at an aerodrome must have, at all times, at least one security official or acting security official.

- The primary security line partner is required to identify at least one security official or acting security official to be available at all times. The security official should work for the primary security line partner, be located at the aerodrome, and have working knowledge and familiarity of the facilities and security systems at the aerodrome. The security official or acting security official does not have to be on-site at all times, but he or she is required to be available at all times.
- Due to vacation, illness, etc., the security official(s) may not be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year; therefore, the partner should consider assigning an alternate security official who could assume the role when/if the security official is unavailable. This would ensure continued compliance with the requirement for a partner to have a security official available at all times.
- An alternate would not be necessary if the partner has more than one security official whose schedules cover off the availability requirement of 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- A Class 1 partner may have a number of security officials, including senior management and/or security personnel, who would normally respond to security incidents and deal with the aerodrome operator and Transport Canada at the local level.

The expectation of the security official is that they will carry out the airport security program requirements, such as:

- Identifying and documenting employees with security roles and responsibilities;
- Developing security awareness training that is specific to their facility and which is not covered, or is complementary to the aerodrome's security awareness program;
- Develop measures to protect restricted areas and prevent breaches;
- Describe the areas of the primary security line;
- Document the handling of sensitive information;
- Provide information to the aerodrome operator and to the Minister upon notice, which in this case means the local aerodrome authority and local aviation security inspectors.

Therefore the partner may wish to consider the following when selecting a security official(s):

- Can the individual be at the facility when the inspection is conducted?

- Would he/she, or their alternate, be available at all times should there be a security breach or other issues at the facility?
- Is he/she totally familiar with all arrangements at the facility in order to provide information to address a concern or issue?

16.2 PROVIDE THE MINISTER AND THE AERODROME OPERATOR WITH THE NAME AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF THE SECURITY OFFICIAL(S)

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 226 (2)*

Contact information:

(2) The primary security line partner must provide the operator of the aerodrome and the Minister with

- (a) the name of each security official and acting security official; and*
- (b) 24-hour contact information for those officials.*

- The partner is required to provide the aerodrome operator and the Minister with the name of the security official(s).
- The partner is required to provide the aerodrome operator and the Minister with contact information for the security official(s).
- Partners may already have an efficient means of communicating with their aerodrome operator; however, this process may not be documented. If the existing process is effective and the partner would like to continue using it, the partner should simply document it. If no communication process exists, then the partner should create and document one to be followed. A request for the operator and the Regional Director of Security (who will accept notification on behalf of the Minister) to follow a particular communication process should be sent directly to them along with information of the security official (i.e. a 24/7 pager or phone number for communication and the on-duty or on-call security official).

Transport Canada encourages partners to establish the most effective means of keeping the aerodrome operator and the Minister informed, including:

- Changes to the name and contact information of the security official(s); and
- Any changes to their preferred communications process, if one exists.

This process for contacting a security official may include providing the aerodrome operator and Transport Canada with a:

- Pager number;
- Telephone number (including a security operations centre number, if applicable); and/or
- Schedule for the security officials.

Partners should review their contact information on a regular basis to ensure that contact numbers and schedules are up-to-date or that pagers, where used, are working properly. Partners should ensure that the aerodrome operator and Minister are notified of any changes.

Some partners may have a number of facilities at various airports across the country and may wish to name someone from their head office as security official. While this is acceptable, it is strongly recommended that the partner identify an on-site employee who is familiar with the employees, the physical layout of the airport, and the security measures in place at the facility.

17. SUPPORT FOR AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS

17.1 DEFINE AND DOCUMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 227 (a)
and (b)*

Requirements:

227. At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must

(a) define and document the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to each of the partner's employee groups and contractors groups that require access to restricted areas at the aerodrome

*in the course of their employment;
(b) communicate the information referred to in paragraph (a) to the employees and contractors in those groups and document how that information is communicated;*

17.1.1 DEFINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The partner is required to determine which employees and/or contractors in their organization have aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. Partners with many employees and/or contractors may wish to first compile a list of all employee/contractor groups and then define their respective aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities. At the same time, the partner could review work descriptions, standard operating procedures, directives, contracts, etc.

Employee groups are persons directly employed by the partner. Employee groups with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities may include:

- Management, including the security manager(s);
- Security official(s); and/or
- Security staff (e.g., security guards, security supervisors, security response officers, etc.).

Contractor groups are persons contracted by the partner. Contractor groups with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities may include:

- Personnel controlling access to/from the restricted area such as contracted security guard companies; and/or
- Maintenance staff.

Partner employees including those contracted by the partner may be grouped in the following categories, as applicable:

- Partner management including the security manager(s);
- Partner security official(s);
- Partner security staff (e.g., security guards, security supervisors, security response officers, etc.);
- Cargo agents; and/or
- Personnel controlling access to/from the restricted area (e.g., air carrier customer service representatives, etc.).

Partners should establish the most effective means of keeping the Minister informed of changes to aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities, including the main contact information for the designated security official. They should also adopt a way to ensure 24-hour contact capability between the security official, aerodrome operator, and Transport Canada. They may also wish to consider developing procedures for the rapid and systematic collection and dissemination of information between the security official and other organizations.

17.1.2 DOCUMENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The partner is required to document the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to each employee and/or contractor group. These security roles and responsibilities may already exist within job descriptions. Please note, participating in the security awareness program is not a security-related role and responsibility.

17.1.3 COMMUNICATE SECURITY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The partner is required to communicate the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities¹² to those employee and/or contractor groups it has assigned these duties.

Depending on the size and scale of the partner's operation, they may wish to develop a process for communicating aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities to their employees and contractors. The partner may wish to:

- Develop a communications plan or strategy to communicate their assigned aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities; and/or
- Have employees and contractors sign-off on their assigned security-specific roles and responsibilities in order to demonstrate their awareness of these roles and responsibilities.

17.1.4 VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

Aviation security inspectors will review documented aerodrome-related security roles and responsibi-

lities for security personnel during their inspection. The inspector will:

- Review the types of employees and/or contractor groups the operator has identified as having aerodrome security-related roles and responsibilities;
- Review a sample of the documented roles and responsibilities; and
- Discuss observations.

Sample Employee Group - Reception/ Administrative Officer (Front Desk Staff)

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Control and authorize access to restricted area;
- Issue temporary/block passes;
- Verify other documents of entitlement approved by the airport operator;
- Report any unusual phone calls or unknown persons;
- Record details of security incidents/breaches; and
- Contact senior management if/when the incident or breach warrants the escalation to senior managers.

Sample Contractor Group - Maintenance Staff

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Maintain security vigilance at all times and report any/all potential security issues immediately;
- Challenge unknown persons and request to see their document of entitlement;
- Control restricted area access; and
- Successfully complete the aerodrome and/or partner security awareness course.

17.2 AERODROME-RELATED SECURITY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - SECURITY OFFICIAL

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 225*

Interpretation:

225. A security official of a primary security line partner at an aerodrome in an individual who is responsible for

¹² "Aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities" means the security-specific roles and responsibilities given to individuals that are associated with their work, tasks, and activities at the aerodrome.

*(a) coordinating and overseeing compliance with regulatory requirements that apply to the partner under this Part; and
(b) acting as the principal contact between the partner, the operator of the aerodrome and the Minister with respect to security matters, including compliance with the regulatory requirements that apply to the partner under this Part.*

Security officials fall under the definition of “aerodrome security personnel” within the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.¹³ Therefore, the primary security line partner is required to document aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities assigned to their security official(s). When defining and documenting the aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities of their security official(s), the partner should consider not only the duties that meet the regulatory requirements, but any other security needs and expectations that the partner may have of their security official(s).

The partner may want to consider assigning the security official the following duties:

- Providing oversight of day-to-day security operations within their facility at the aerodrome;
- Identifying and documenting employees and contractors with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;
- Monitoring and evaluating the results of corrective actions related to security risks, incidents, and breaches;
- Maintaining effective coordination and liaison with other areas of the aerodrome, including other partners and tenants, the aerodrome security official(s), and Transport Canada;
- Describing the areas of the primary security line;
- Ensuring the protection of security-sensitive information;
- Conducting quality assurance/control reviews to ensure effectiveness of security processes and procedures;
- Providing advice and guidance to the partner on the development, implementation, and

maintenance of the airport security program requirements;

- Participating on the aerodrome’s security committee or other working groups or forums;
- Ensuring their organization understands and supports the aerodrome in applying its airport security program;
- Serving as the main point of contact for their organization regarding all security-related issues, incidents, and activities; and
- Overseeing the security awareness program for their organization.

Therefore, the partner may wish to consider the following when selecting a security official(s):

- Can the individual be at the facility when inspections are conducted?
- Would the security official, or their alternate, be available at all times should there be a security breach or other issues at the facility requiring his or her immediate presence? and
- Is the security official completely familiar with all arrangements at the facility in order to provide information to address a concern or issue?

Sample Employee Group - Security Official(s)

Roles and Responsibilities:

- Oversee the day-to-day security operations of the partner;
- Act as the main contact between the aerodrome operator, and the Minister with respect to security matters;
 - *Serve as main contact for the partner for all security-related issues, incidents and activities (requires 24 hour a day/7 day a week coverage; delegation where necessary);*
 - *Serve as liaison for all security-related issues with other partners, including aerodrome operator, local law enforcement, Transport Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Canada Border Services Agency, and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority;*
- Manage partner security personnel and oversee/direct their activities at the aerodrome;
- Maintain security vigilance at all times and report any/all potential security issues immediately; and
- Successfully complete the aerodrome and/or partner security awareness course.

¹³ “Aerodrome security personnel” means individuals who are employed by the operator of an aerodrome or by one of the operator’s contractors to prepare for, detect, prevent, respond to, and assist in the recovery from, acts or attempted acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

17.3 SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAM

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 227 (c)*

Requirements:

227. At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must

(c) establish, implement and document a security awareness program that promotes a culture of security vigilance and awareness among its employees if the security awareness program of the operator of the aerodrome does not cover matters that are unique to the partner's operations;

Security awareness is the process of engaging employees, contractors, and relevant players within the airport community to maintain security vigilance and to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities to aviation security. This should include awareness of surroundings, familiarity with security issues, and procedures, as well as response information.

It is recommended that all persons employed by the partner at the aerodrome or who require access to the aerodrome participate in the security awareness program. Primary security line partners may decide that personnel with aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities do not need to participate in the partner's security awareness program because they have already received more comprehensive aerodrome-related security training. In some cases, certain personnel may be responsible for delivering security awareness training.

Primary security line partners may wish to participate in the aerodrome operator's awareness program, and supplement that program by ensuring that their employees are aware of aerodrome security-related issues that are unique to the partner's operation and **not covered in the aerodrome operator's awareness program** (e.g., access control and alarm system for the facility, policy on visitors/escorting with the facility, etc.).

Partners developing and implementing a security awareness program may wish to:

1. Establish security awareness program objectives or goals that reflect and support the overall security policy and goals of the organization to:
 - Outline the current security requirements; and
 - Identify the program's goal including promoting a culture of security vigilance and awareness.
2. Identify employees, contractors, and others who should receive security awareness. The awareness training may vary depending on the nature of the roles and responsibilities, and the specific needs of each group.
3. Make sure that the awareness program includes persons who require access to the restricted area, as well as those working within the public areas of the partner's facility.

Examples of some of the persons who require access to the restricted area:

- Cargo handlers;
- Catering personnel;
- Customer service agents;
- Access control;
- Aircraft maintenance personnel;
- Baggage handlers;
- De-icing personnel;
- Fuellers; and
- Pilots and flight attendants.

Examples persons who have access within the public areas of the aerodrome:

- Consultants;
- Building maintenance personnel;
- Cargo handlers;
- Concessions staff working in public area of partners facilities; and
- Catering staff.

While the airport's security awareness program may capture all employees and persons who require access to the airport, one main objective should be to capture employees who would receive no other security training. Security personnel who have aerodrome security roles and responsibilities may have received specific security training elsewhere, and therefore, may not need to be included in the partner's security awareness training program. In

fact, some security personnel may be responsible for developing and administering/delivering the partner's security awareness program.

4. Ensure employees receive information about:
 - The purpose of a security awareness program and the applicable regulatory requirements;
 - The Aerodrome Security Policy Statement and its relevance to a partner's employees and others who access the partner's site;
 - The risks to physical assets and stored information;
 - The indicators of suspicious or unusual behaviour in an aviation environment and how to report them;
 - Procedures for receiving, retaining, disposing of, and disclosing sensitive security information;
 - Procedures for reporting and responding to security incidents;
 - Relevant aerodrome security procedures and policies; and
 - The need to maintain a culture of security awareness and vigilance amongst employees at the aerodrome.
5. Encourage employees to identify security gaps that may need to be addressed or make suggestions for improvements to the partner's security awareness program or other security policies and procedures. Explain the process for reporting incidents, including who to inform, the number to call, and details to record. Where possible coordinate and harmonize with the aerodrome operator.
6. Have a recognition program to promote security vigilance and awareness by rewarding individuals who consistently meet or exceed expectations.
7. Use a variety of tools, media and methods for the partner's awareness program or to supplement the aerodrome's awareness program (e.g., emails, videos, posters and pamphlets, etc.).
8. Include security awareness training in orientation for new employee and implement a system to provide ongoing and refresher security awareness sessions.
9. Assess the effectiveness of the security awareness program:

- Determine the current baseline for security awareness at an aerodrome;
- Identify program goals;
- Track progress toward achieving the identified goals;
- Review incident reporting and monitoring to note any changes or trends;
- Evaluate and test (i.e., during and after awareness program delivery); and
- Adjust the program as necessary.

10. Document the awareness program so it can be delivered or repeated consistently.

Please note, Security Measures and other material marked unauthorized disclosure prohibited (UDP) should not be included in the security awareness program. Only persons who have a need and right to know should have access to Security Measures and UDP material. In these cases, Security Measures and UDP material should be provided directly, by coaching, in a meeting, etc. Because they are security sensitive, Security Measures and UDP material should be dealt with in a controlled manner and should not be placed online, in common documents, etc.. Note, section 4.79 of the *Aeronautics Act* prohibits the disclosure of the substance of Security Measures.

17.4 MEASURES TO PROTECT RESTRICTED AREAS AND TO PREVENT SECURITY BREACHES

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 227 (d)*

Requirements:

227. At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must

(d) document the measures, procedures and processes that the partner has in place at the aerodrome to protect the security of restricted areas and to prevent breaches of the primary security line;

If the partner already has security procedures and processes in place to protect restricted areas and to prevent breaches, review them to ensure that they are still appropriate and to determine whether or not they need to be updated. If the processes have not yet been documented, record them.

When considering how to protect the restricted area and prevent breaches, the partner may wish to consider and/or identify potential ways in which the primary security line might be breached through their facilities/access points/area(s). For example, they could consider:

- Is there access through or around the area?
 - If so, what type(s) (e.g., gates, doors, walkways, ramps, stairs, windows, ladders, over roofs, etc.)?
- How is access to each restricted area access point controlled (e.g., locks, fences, continual observation, access control systems, camera system, staff, etc.)?
- What is in place to ensure the ongoing viability or effectiveness of each of these mitigation measures?
- How and when is the identified prevention measure(s) tested and/or reviewed to determine whether or not adjustments or updates are necessary?

Document the potential ways in which the partner's primary security line could be breached and then develop and implement processes to prevent these breaches from occurring. Where possible, partners should work with the aerodrome operator to coordinate and harmonize various strategies. Partners must be prepared to make this information available to the airport operator and the Minister upon reasonable notice (during inspections).

17.5 CREATE A DOCUMENT DESCRIBING AREAS ON THE PRIMARY SECURITY LINE

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 227 (e)*

Requirements:

227. At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must

- (e) create a document that
 - (i) describes each area on the aerodrome's primary security line that is occupied by the partner,
 - (ii) indicates the location of each restricted area access point in those areas, and
 - (iii) describes those restricted area access points;

An efficient way to satisfy this regulation is to create an accurate map/floor plan that identifies the area(s) occupied and the restricted area access points. Consider adding a legend to describe the type of access point (e.g., pedestrian door, vehicle gate, etc.) and the means of controlling access to the restricted area (e.g., lock hardware/metal key, mechanical/electronic hardware, etc.).

Example:



Example:

Access point details:

- ① Office # 123: access to apron
 - lock type ABC
 - key code AS44
 - key issue restricted to Employee security code 3 and above
 - monitoring schedule: daily

By regulation, the map(s) must be made available to the aerodrome operator and Minister on request.

17.6 SECURITY INFORMATION PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 227 (f) and (g) and 235.1*

Requirements:

227. At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must

(f) establish, implement and document a process for receiving, retaining, disclosing and disposing of sensitive information respecting aerodrome security in order to protect the information from unauthorized access; and

(g) identify sensitive information respecting aviation security and receive, retain, disclose and dispose of sensitive information respecting aerodrome security in a manner that protects and the information from unauthorized access.

Prohibition:

235.1. A person other than the Minister must not disclose security-sensitive information that is created or used under this Division unless the disclosure is required by law or is necessary to comply or facilitate compliance with the aviation security provisions of the Act, regulatory requirements or the requirements of an emergency direction.

The above paragraph focuses on the documentation and handling of sensitive aerodrome security information, including:

- Identification;
- Receipt;
- Retention;
- Storage;
- Dissemination;
- Disclosure; and
- Disposal.

With the introduction of AVSEC levels and menus of additional safeguards for aerodrome operators, primary security line partners may find that they are exposed to an increased amount of sensitive information. It is suggested that the partner develop/adopt and implement a process for keeping aerodrome security information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access. A sample process is included below.

NOTE: The partner must be able to show that it handles confidential security information in a secure manner at all times.

A suggested process for PROTECTING sensitive information may include:

- Receiving sensitive information;
- Logging receipt of sensitive information in a register;
- Classifying the information based on level of sensitivity and set the retention period;
- Determining if the information needs to be shared immediately and with whom;
- Disclosing information to persons who have a legitimate need and right to know;
- Logging the disclosure of the sensitive information in register;
- Storing the sensitive information, as set out in procedures, until the end of the retention period;
- Disposing of sensitive information; and
- Logging the disposal of the sensitive information in a register.

At times, partners may be provided with classified or protected information from Government of Canada security partners, such as Transport Canada. The following outlines the Government of Canada criteria for dealing with sensitive information. Information may also be found in the *Guideline for Employees of the Government of Canada: Information Management (IM) Basics* document.¹⁴ Partners may wish to consider this information when developing their processes and when handling government classified or protected information.

Examples of Sensitive Aerodrome Security Information Respecting Aerodrome Security:

- Security measures, interim orders, security notices and other security requirements issued by Transport Canada (e.g., unauthorized disclosure prohibited material);
- Aviation security threat or risk information;
- Aviation security emergency plans and procedures;
- Airport security program information; and
- Meeting summaries and records of decisions (e.g., for the aerodrome security committee, dependent upon sensitivity of information, etc.).

When RECEIVING sensitive information, the partners may want to consider:

- Who is responsible for receiving sensitive information?
- Do these people have a need and right to know the information?

¹⁴ <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=16557§ion=text>

- Which people/organizations need to receive the sensitive information from the partner (e.g., contract security, aerodrome operator, Transport Canada, etc.)?
- Is the list developed, reviewed and updated on a regular basis, and by whom?
- What training is required for receiving and protecting sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the receipt of information?
- How is the information processed?
 - *Identify and mark the sensitivity of the information received based on pre-defined levels of sensitivity;*
 - *Identify the urgency of the information;*
 - *Limit the number of copies distributed; and*
 - *Determine the need to retain the sensitive information once disclosed.*

When RETAINING sensitive information, the partner may want to consider:

- Who is responsible for keeping sensitive records?
- How and where are sensitive records to stored/protected (i.e., in hard copy and/or electronically on a secure network)?
- Are there special access controls for the locations and/or systems where sensitive information is stored?
- How should sensitive records be handled when in use?
- What training is required for keeping sensitive information?
- How does the organization record storage of sensitive information?

When DISCLOSING sensitive information, the partner may want to consider:

- How is sensitive information disclosed or transmitted?
- What medium will be used for disclosure (e.g., paper, electronic, etc.)?
- What security options for disclosure are available (e.g., double envelope, encryption, etc.)?
- Who needs to know this information for the purposes of carrying out their aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities, including:
 - *Persons employed at the aerodrome; and*
 - *Persons who require access to the aerodrome in the course of their employment.*

- Is giving sensitive information to persons on a “need to know basis” consistent with the person’s security roles and responsibilities and/or based on pre-defined levels of sensitivities?
- Who has adequate security clearance to receive sensitive information?
- What training is required for those authorized to disclose sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the disclosure of sensitive information?

When DISPOSING of sensitive information, the partner may want to consider:

- What storage and disposal timeframes will be adequate for the information?
- Who will dispose of the sensitive information?
- Where and how is the information to be disposed of (e.g., shredding)?
- What training is required for those disposing of sensitive information?
- How does the organization record the disposal of sensitive information?

Special Notes about Access to Information:

- Any information provided to Transport Canada or other federal departments is subject to the *Access to Information Act*. The department is sensitive to industry concerns related to the potential release an aerodrome operators’ sensitive third party aviation security information;
- Under subsection 20(1) of the *Access to Information Act*, Transport Canada must refuse to disclose third-party information related to financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, **but only where the third party has consistently treated the information as confidential and has provided that information to the department in confidence.** In order for Transport Canada to treat a primary security line partner’s information as a third-party confidence (should it ever become the subject of an access to Information request), it is helpful for the partner to have and follow an internal process for storing sensitive information. Transport Canada has additional discretion under the *Access to Information Act* to exempt security-related information where the disclosure of that information could:
 - *Adversely affect the conduct of international affairs; the defence of Canada or an allied country; or Canada’s ability to counteract intelligence operations or subversive activities targeted towards Canada or its allies (section 15); or*

- *Compromise the security of facilities, computer systems (section 16(2)).*

NOTE: The *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012* has clear restrictions on when security-sensitive information can be disclosed, and prohibits disclosure unless it is for the purposes of implementing or meeting an aviation security regulatory requirement.

17.7 DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY-SENSITIVE INFORMATION

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 235.1*

Prohibition:

A person other than the Minister must not disclose security-sensitive information that is created or used under this Division unless the disclosure is required by law or is necessary to comply or facilitate compliance with the aviation security provisions of the Act, regulatory requirements or the requirements of an emergency direction.

Keep this prohibition in mind when developing processes and procedures for disclosing security-sensitive information. Disclosure to persons must be limited to the extent required in order to meet aviation security requirements.

Where possible, disclosure of security-sensitive information should be adapted and/or appropriate to the security roles and responsibilities of the persons receiving the information.

Government of Canada Information Management Criteria:

Classified information refers to the *national interest*. It concerns the defence and maintenance of the social, political and economic stability of Canada. There are three levels of classified information:

1. **Top secret:** A very limited amount of compromised information could cause *exceptionally grave injury* to the national interest.

2. **Secret:** Compromise could cause *serious injury* to the national interest.
3. **Confidential:** Compromise could cause *limited injury* to the national interest.

Protected information refers to specific provisions of the *Access to Information Act* and the *Privacy Act* and applies to sensitive personal, private, and business information.

1. **Protected C:** Compromise of a very limited amount of information could result in *exceptionally grave injury*, such as loss of life.
2. **Protected B:** Compromise could result in *grave injury*, such as loss of reputation or competitive advantage.
3. **Protected A:** Compromise could result in *limited injury*.

NOTE: Partners should assign and explain roles and responsibilities for protecting sensitive information should be assigned and explained to persons who have a legitimate need and right to know the information before implementing the process.

17.8 PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO AERODROME OPERATOR AND THE MINISTER

*Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1
Aerodromes – Part 4, Division 11, s. 231*

Provision of information to operator of aerodrome:

(1) At each aerodrome where a primary security line partner carries out operations, the partner must provide the operator of the aerodrome with the information that is documented or created under this Division on reasonable notice given by the operator.

Provision to Minister:

(2) The primary security line partner must provide the Minister with the same information on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

The partner is required to be prepared to provide both the aerodrome operator and the Minister with the information that is documented or created

under each of the aerodrome security elements for primary security line partners under the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*:

1. Aerodrome-related security roles and responsibilities;
2. Security awareness program;
3. Measures to protect restricted areas and prevent breaches;
4. Describe areas used, areas on primary security line, access points; and
5. Process for dealing with sensitive information.

Requirements for a security official are found in Section 16. Requirements for corrective actions are found in Section 18. These sections also include requirements to make information available to the aerodrome operator and/or the Minister.

17.8.1 RETENTION OF AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM INFORMATION

While there are no regulatory requirements for partners to retain documented airport security program information, it is considered a best practice for partners to retain this documentation for at least 2 years.

18. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

18.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 1 Aerodromes - Part 4, Division 11, s. 234 and 235

Corrective Actions:

234. (1) *Subject to section 235, a primary security line partner must immediately take corrective actions to address a vulnerability that contributes to an aerodrome-related security risk and that*

(a) is identified to the partner by the Minister;

(b) is identified to the partner by the operator of the aerodrome where the partner carries out operations; or

(c) is identified by the partner.

Notification:

234. (2) *If a primary security line partner takes corrective actions at an aerodrome, the primary security line partner must immediately notify the operator of the aerodrome.*

Corrective action plan:

235. *If a corrective action to be taken by a primary security line partner under section 234 involves a phased approach, the primary security line partner must provide the Minister and the operator of the aerodrome with a corrective action plan that sets out*

(a) the nature of the vulnerability to be addressed;

(b) a rationale for the phased approach; and

(c) a timetable setting out when each phase of the corrective action plan will be completed.

The partner is required to notify the aerodrome operator if a corrective action (required to mitigate an identified security risk) requires a phased approach. While notification of the aerodrome operator is only regulated when a phased corrective action is taken, it is recommended that the partner also notify the aerodrome operator when the Minister has identified a security risk for which an immediate corrective action was taken. Since the partners have been regulated to support the airport's security program, it is important that partners maintain open lines of communication with their aerodrome operator.

The partner should consider developing a process for implementing corrective actions (immediate or phased).

Section 235 was added in recognition of the fact that there may be cases where the immediate interim solution to address an identified security risk is not sustainable for a prolonged period of time or is not the ultimate solution for addressing the risk. In these cases, where a phased approach is involved, a corrective action plan is required to ensure that the risk is continuously addressed until the ultimate solution is reached.

Sample - Process

An analysis of the risk, incident, or breach is conducted, including information input from affected aerodrome stakeholders.

1. Define the issue.
 - a. Transport Canada or another source identifies an aviation security risk;
 - b. A security incident or breach has occurred;
 - c. An unmitigated risk has been identified;
 - d. There appears to be a reoccurring issue; or
 - e. Aerodrome processes and procedures are not meeting regulatory requirements.
2. Gather data and information relevant to the issue (include information or input from affected aerodrome stakeholders).
3. Analyze the data and information gathered.
4. Identify and develop corrective actions to address the issue.
 - a. Identify who, what, where, when, and how for each action.
 - b. Identify timeframes for taking corrective action.
 - c. Where longer term corrective action is required, document in a corrective action plan.
 - d. Identify monitoring activities.
 - e. Validate corrective action prior to implementing (e.g., testing process, procedures, etc.).
 - f. Assess the impact of the corrective action on operations (e.g., new risks, threats, etc.).
5. Implement corrective action.

NOTE: Use the above steps to take immediate corrective action to ensure that the risk does not continue.
6. Conduct follow-up once the risk has been addressed and prevented from continuing.
 - a. Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective action and document the process and results.
 - b. Determine if the issue has been resolved;
 - i. If issue has not been resolved, repeat the process.
 - ii. If issue has been resolved, share lessons learned and corrective actions/plans with affected aerodrome stakeholders, as required.

The immediate corrective action may resolve the risk entirely. For example, the risk was caused by a hole in the primary security line fence, which is mended immediately; however, in this case, corrective action should include more frequent inspection of the primary security line.

A phased corrective action process commences once the partner's operations have returned to normal following a security breach or incident and when a more complex or comprehensive corrective action is necessary. For example; the locking mechanism (manual or electronic) on an restricted area access point door has failed and is not controlling access to the restricted area.

1. A security guard is posted immediately to deal with the risk and control access.
2. The phased corrective action plan would include ordering new parts or having maintenance repair the gate and then test to verify that it is repaired at which time the security guard will be removed.

Partners should consider the following when developing and implementing corrective actions:

- Monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their processes and procedures to meet the aviation security requirements and document the process and results;
- Develop a corrective action/plan that is achievable and realistic;
- Identify and document what is to be done and who is responsible for completion;
- Determine what resources are needed and approvals required;
- Establish necessary contacts in other organizations that may need to be consulted or will have a role in the implementation of the corrective actions;
- Determine the need to establish, monitor, and update security performance measures; and
- Review and update plans, programs, processes, and procedures to reflect new measures that address the aviation security risk.

NOTE: Regulations require primary security line partners to take corrective actions to address an identified risk. If the identified risk is the result of non-compliance with a regulatory provision, partners should be aware that taking corrective

action does not preclude Transport Canada from taking enforcement action with respect to non-compliance, depending on the circumstances and seriousness surrounding the identified risk.

19. ADMINISTRATION OF AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM ELEMENTS BY PRIMARY SECURITY LINE PARTNERS

Partners are required to implement the airport security program requirements outlined in the preceding sections of this document and in accordance with the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*. They are required to make the airport security program information that they documented or create under these requirements available to both the Minister and the aerodrome operator on reasonable notice.

It is acceptable for a group of partners who have more than one facility or area on the primary security line, who are co-located, or who lease space from a common leaser to develop a joint program. In this case, it is imperative that all partners contribute information to the development of and participate in the joint program.

Some things to consider:

- If a common security official is selected, all partners will need to be satisfied with this person responding to calls from the aerodrome operator or the Minister on their behalf;
- Each partner's employees or contractors (or employee or contractor groups) with security roles and responsibilities are required to be identified, as well as their security roles and responsibilities;
- While one partner may develop the security awareness program, the employees or contractors of each partner will need to be included and their unique operations will need to be addressed in the joint program;
- Airport security programs are intended to be site specific, for each facility at an aerodrome, as well as for each of a partner's locations; and
- The areas occupied by each partner on the primary security line will need to be identified on a document, which will need to include the location of each restricted area access point for

each partner. The document must also include a description of each restricted access point (e.g., pedestrian door, vehicular gate, roll-up or overhead door, as well as the access control on it whether it be manual lock, electronic access control, guard posting, etc.).

In the case of a joint airport security program, aviation security inspectors will need to speak to each partner during the inspection. This can be done in a group setting with a representative from each partner present or it can be done individually. In either case, it will be important for each partner to be familiar with the joint airport security program and how it works.

- While aerodrome operators may ask their partners to complete an airport security program template and provide it to the operator, Transport Canada does not require the submission of airport security program information by the partner.
- Although the Minister has the authority to request a partner's airport security information upon reasonable notice, aviation security inspectors will generally request to review a partner's airport security program information, in any form that it is provided, at the time of on-site inspection.
- Assessment of compliance with airport security programs by aviation security inspectors is not simply a paper exercise. Through observation, sampling, and interviewing, aviation security inspectors will evaluate whether or not the requirement **exists**, has been **implemented**, and whether or not it is **effective**.
- Aviation security inspectors will be available to provide guidance and advice to partners in the development of their airport security program requirements.

**CHAPTER 3 –
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIMARY SECURITY LINE
PARTNERS AT CLASS 2 AND 3 AERODROMES**



20. PRIMARY SECURITY LINE PARTNERS - CLASS 2 AND CLASS 3 AERODROMES

20.1 OVERVIEW

This section provides explanations, guidance and examples to help primary security line partners¹⁵ at Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes in completing their airport security program requirements under Part 5, Division 9 and Part 6, Division 8 of the *Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012*.

Primary security line partners (hereafter referred to as “partners”) for Class 2 and Class 3 aerodromes should ensure that their development and implementation efforts related to an airport security program are coordinated and harmonized with their aerodrome operators’ program. Regulating primary security line partners for airport security programs will help improve aerodromes airport security programs.

NOTE: There is no requirement for primary security line partners to submit airport security program documentation for approval. Aviation security inspectors will conduct on-site oversight/inspection to verify compliance.

20.2 PROVISION OF INFORMATION

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 2 Aerodromes – Part 5, Division 9, s. 374 (1) (a) and (2)
Primary Security Line Partners at Class 3 Aerodromes – Part 6, Division 8, s. 481 (1) (a) and (2)

Provision of information to operator of aerodrome:

(1) For the purpose of supporting the establishment and implementation of an

airport security program by the operator of an aerodrome, a primary security line partner at the aerodrome must, on reasonable notice given by the operator, provide the operator with

(a) information respecting the measures, procedures and processes that the partner has in place at the aerodrome to protect the security of restricted areas and to prevent breaches of the primary security line; and

Provision of information to Minister:

(2) The primary security line partner must provide the Minister with the information and the document on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

If the partner already has security measures, procedures, and processes in place, review them to ensure that they are still appropriate and determine whether or not they need to be updated. If they have not already been documented, record them.

When considering how to protect the restricted area and prevent breaches, the partner may wish to consider and/or identify potential ways in which the primary security line could be breached through their facilities/access points/area(s). For example, they may consider:

- Are there restricted area access points through or around the area?;
- If so, what types of restricted area access points exist (e.g., gates, doors, walkways, ramps, stairs, windows, ladders, over roofs, etc.)?;
- How is each restricted area access point controlled (e.g., locks, fences, continual observation, access control systems, camera systems, staff, etc.)?;
- What is in place to ensure the viability or effectiveness of each of the mitigation measures?; and
- How and when is the identified prevention measure(s) tested and reviewed to determine whether or not adjustments or updates are needed?

¹⁵ A “primary security line partner” means a business, organization or non-profit group—other than the operator of an aerodrome, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, a government department or agency or the police service with jurisdiction at an aerodrome—that occupies an area that is on an aerodrome’s primary security line and that includes a restricted area access point. This definition includes, but is not limited to, a commercial lessee of the operator of an aerodrome.

Document the potential ways in which the partner's primary security line might be breached, and then develop and implement processes to prevent these potential breaches from occurring. Where possible, partners should work with the aerodrome operator to coordinate and harmonize various strategies. Partners should be prepared to make this information available to the aerodrome operator or the Minister upon request.

20.3 DOCUMENT DESCRIBING AREAS ON THE PRIMARY SECURITY LINE

Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, 2012 **Primary Security Line Partners at Class 2**

Aerodromes –

Part 5, Division 9, s. 374 (1) (b) and (2)

Primary Security Line Partners at Class 3

Aerodromes –

Part 6, Division 8, s. 481 (1) (b) and (2)

Provision of information to operator of aerodrome:

(1) For the purpose of supporting the establishment and implementation of an airport security program by the operator of an aerodrome, a primary security line partner at the aerodrome must, on reasonable notice given by the operator, provide the operator with

(b) a document that

(i) describes each area on the aerodrome's primary security line that is occupied by the partner,

(ii) indicates the location of each restricted area access point in those areas, and (iii) describes those restricted area access points.

Provision of information to Minister:

(2) The primary security line partner must provide the Minister with the information and the document on reasonable notice given by the Minister.

An efficient way to satisfy this regulation is to create an accurate map/floor plan that identifies the area occupied and the restricted area access points.

Consider adding a legend to describe the type of access point (e.g., pedestrian door, vehicular gate, etc.) and the means of controlling access to the restricted area (e.g., lock hardware/metal key, mechanical/electronic hardware, etc.).

Example:



Example:

Access point details:


- ① Office # 123: access to apron
 - lock type ABC
 - key code AS44
 - key issue restricted to Employee security code 3 and above
 - monitoring schedule: daily

By regulation, the map is required to be made available to the aerodrome operator and Minister upon request.

ANNEX A

*See Supplementary Guidance Material

ANNEX B APPROVAL PROCESS CHART



ANNEX C

*See Supplementary Guidance Material